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Introduction
This project was funded by the Arts & Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for the duration of
two years (2012–2014). Its main objective was to critically analyse the extent to which Northern
Ireland and Ireland have been successful in implementing effective action against transnational
organised crime, including the observance of relevant human rights norms and principles, with
particular reference to cross-border co-operation. The core research team consisted of Professor
Tom Obokata (Principal Investigator), Dr Brian Payne (Research Fellow), and Professor John
Jackson (Consultant). The project was overseen by an advisory board of stakeholders from both
jurisdictions, representing agencies such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland, An Garda
Síochána, the Department of Justice Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice and Equality in
Ireland, the Organised Crime Task Force in Northern Ireland, HM Revenue & Customs, the
Committee on the Administration of Justice, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties. They provided
advice on the direction of the project and identified relevant stakeholders for in-depth interviews. 
The research team would like to express its immense gratitude to the members of the advisory
board for their support and guidance throughout the research cycle.
Before the initiation of the project, the following research questions were identified:
• How is organised crime defined in Northern Ireland and Ireland? Do the definitions adopted
by both jurisdictions reflect the regional or international standards? If not, why not?
• What are the key law enforcement strategies and measures being adopted in these two
jurisdictions, including those relating to protection and promotion of human rights?
• What provision is there to facilitate cross-border co-operation? 
• What are the factors affecting the effective prevention and suppression of organised crime?
Are these factors common to both jurisdictions or particular to one?
• What challenges are posed to the protection of the human rights of those suspected of
organised crime and its victims as well as the general public?
• Is there a strong link between organised crime and terrorism, particularly in Northern Ireland?
Are the law enforcement responses adequate to address this nexus?
• In light of the devolution of powers relating to criminal justice and policing in Northern Ireland,
what are the key challenges facing authorities from both jurisdictions, particularly in relation
to cross-border co-operation?
• How are the regional (EU law) and international (UN Convention) standards implemented in
practice at the national level?
This final report provides answers to these research questions. In order to facilitate maximisation of
impact, it also highlights numerous examples of good practice and recommendations for further
consideration. Many issues discussed in this report also have wider implications beyond the island
of Ireland, and it is hoped that relevant stakeholders and scholars in other jurisdictions find it useful.
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In relation to research methodologies, the bulk of the research was based on a desktop analysis
(literature survey) of relevant national, regional, and international legislation, reports published by
governmental and non-governmental organisations, and national/international cases, as well as
academic literature on the subject. This desktop work was significantly supplemented by a series
of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders. The research team was granted
unprecedented access to key law enforcement agencies, civil society organisations, and the legal
profession in both jurisdictions, allowing it to interview over 90 stakeholders. The research team
is extremely grateful to everyone who kindly offered his/her time to be interviewed as well as to
the advisory board for their assistance in identifying interviewees.
This report is divided into several sections. Section 1 starts with an analysis of the legal and non-
legal definitions of organised crime adopted in Northern Ireland and Ireland. Section 2 examines
the legislative frameworks relating to three forms of organised crime: human trafficking, drug
offences, and fiscal/excise fraud. Section 3 continues with an analysis of law enforcement
practice. The major focus was placed upon the use of special investigative techniques which
facilitate intelligence-led law enforcement, including surveillance and interception of
communications, and provisions for formal and informal cross-border co-operation. In Section
4, issues relating to criminal proceedings and confiscation of criminal proceeds—such as trial
without jury, evidential matters, and civil recovery—are explored. Section 5 looks at prevention
initiatives implemented by both jurisdictions. Finally, in Section 6, appropriate benchmarks to
measure the effectiveness of action against organised crime are proposed.
Professor Tom Obokata
Dr Brian Payne
Professor John Jackson
March 2014
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Executive Summary
Understanding Organised Crime
There are two key international and regional instruments designed to facilitate effective action
against organised crime: the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
2000 (‘the Organised Crime Convention’) and the EU Council Framework Decision on the Fight
against Organised Crime. Both instruments provide definitions of an ‘organised criminal group’.
These should be reflected at the national level to facilitate a concerted action against organised
crime, but there is currently no legislation which contains a legal definition of ‘organised crime’
or ‘organised criminal group’ in the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. Instead, there is
a preference for using working definitions adopted by law enforcement agencies such as the
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (now the National Crime Agency (NCA)) and the
Organised Crime Task Force of Northern Ireland (OCTF). These definitions do not resemble the
ones provided by international and European instruments, raising a question as to whether the
UK government pays attention to them. From the point of view of law enforcement on the ground,
however, it was discovered that a lack of a legal definition has not caused any difficulty in Northern
Ireland. This is because the nature and extent of organised crime would appear to dictate the
types of response to be implemented, rather than any particular definitions. In Ireland, Part 7 of
the Criminal Justice Act 2006, as revised by the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, provides
a legal definition of a ‘criminal organisation’. It reflects the international and regional instruments,
demonstrating that Ireland takes these more seriously. One point to note in relation to these
definitions is that they are somewhat wide. In particular, generation of long-term benefit/profit,
which is one of the key features of organised crime, is missing. This can create a risk of them
being applied to a variety of crimes. In practice, it was discovered that the law enforcement
communities have generally been able to distinguish organised crime from ordinary crime and
apply the definitions appropriately. This has also been agreed by the judiciary in both jurisdictions.
Legislative Frameworks on Substantive Offences
The project focused on three core offences: human trafficking, drug offences, and fiscal/excise
fraud such as fuel and tobacco smuggling. In relation to human trafficking, two key statutes in
the United Kingdom are the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment
of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 which prohibit trafficking for both sexual and labour exploitation with
a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 further
addresses slavery and forced labour with a similar punishment regime. The existence of different
statutes means that the legislative framework is rather piecemeal in nature. In contrast, Ireland
has enacted a specific statute to combat human trafficking. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking)
Act 2008 provides for penalties of up to life imprisonment and an unlimited fine. This is an example
of good practice. One area which needs to be rectified is the lack of legislative frameworks on
protection of victims. Although it is important to acknowledge that both jurisdictions do provide
some forms of protection in line with international and European standards, the research team
considers that a clear legal basis is desirable for clarity, consistency, and accountability. It is
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important to mention here that both jurisdictions are dealing with this issue with a view to enacting
legislation.
In relation to drug offences, the UK legislative framework seems appropriate both in terms of the
definitions of offences and the penalties under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Drug trafficking is
taken just as seriously in Ireland, although various issues have been raised by stakeholders. These
include the lack of a drug classification system and the application of presumptive sentencing of
ten years for possession of drugs with an estimated street value of over €13,000 under the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1977. Many stakeholders interviewed in Ireland are of the opinion that an amendment
should be implemented. In addition, so-called ‘legal highs’ seem to be posing some law
enforcement challenges, particularly in the United Kingdom/Northern Ireland where the legislative
framework to deal with them is not as strong as in Ireland.
Finally, the prohibition and prosecution of fiscal/excise fraud in both jurisdictions are based on
the system of customs and excise taxation on key commodities such as fuel, alcohol, and
cigarettes. The Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 in the United Kingdom and the
Finance Acts in Ireland seem to be sufficient to address these crimes. However, stakeholders felt
that the punishment regimes (fines and custodial sentences) are not appropriately enforced.
Law Enforcement
A diverse range of law enforcement agencies have responsibility for tackling organised crime in
both jurisdictions. Northern Ireland has taken a proactive multi-agency approach to addressing
organised crime. Most notable in this regard is the creation of the OCTF in 2000. This brings
together relevant law enforcement agencies, including the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
and HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), other government departments, and local businesses. It
was discovered that the OCTF has played, and continues to play, an important role in facilitating
inter-agency co-operation. One remaining issue in this jurisdiction is the role of the newly created
NCA. The research team learned that there is strong opposition on the part of certain political
parties in Northern Ireland to such an Agency, particularly due to a lack of clear local accountability,
and that its powers are currently limited. While there is a need for proper accountability, the
research team considers that the current situation could lead to undesirable consequences,
particularly in the area of asset recovery. In Ireland, law enforcement against organised crime is
primarily the responsibility of An Garda Síochána’s National Bureau of Criminal Investigation, which
works in conjunction with other Garda Bureaus and Units. Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs is also
important as it has responsibility in enforcing legislation relating to fiscal and excise fraud in Ireland.
It was discovered that these agencies work reasonably well to address organised crime. Unlike
Northern Ireland, however, Ireland does not have an arrangement akin to the OCTF. Given the
benefit of such an arrangement, it might consider establishing a formal structure.
In relation to law enforcement practice, the project specifically looked at the use of special
investigative techniques which are necessary to promote intelligence-led law enforcement. In the
United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides for interception of
communications, surveillance, and use of covert intelligence sources (CHIS). In Ireland, the use of
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surveillance is regulated by the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages
(Regulation) Act 1993 and the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009. The latter is limited to
surveillance with the use of devices and does not apply to other methods such as covert following.
In addition, the use of CHIS in Ireland is not underpinned by legislation. In the main, the research
team considers that the authorising procedures for these special investigative techniques are
sufficiently stringent and these measures appear to be appropriately used by the law enforcement
agencies. This was confirmed by judges in both jurisdictions. However, recommendations are
made for greater judicial oversight to enhance clarity and public confidence in law enforcement.
A number of issues have been raised in relation to law enforcement. A difficulty in identifying
criminal groups, particularly foreign ones, has been raised as an issue which needs to be tackled.
The sophisticated nature of criminal groups and their operations is also making it harder for the
law enforcement communities to investigate. Further, a culture of fear which exists in both
jurisdictions sometimes prevents witnesses, victims, the business community, and the general
public from co-operating with the law enforcement authorities. All of these would require the
relevant authorities to continue their efforts to deploy community policing, investment in
intelligence-led law enforcement, and proactive recruitment of officers from ethnic minority
backgrounds. A lack of adequate human, financial, and other resources was another key problem
experienced by all agencies. In addition to better allocation of resources, a more proactive use
of criminal proceeds is recommended. While there is a scheme whereby Northern Ireland can
utilise confiscated proceeds, the amount is not sufficient as only 50% of the proceeds confiscated
through civil recovery are returned. Moreover, Ireland does not have a similar arrangement,
although a point has been raised that it is more transparent to return all proceeds to the
Exchequer. There is therefore scope for further consideration in both jurisdictions.
Protection of human rights in both jurisdictions was also examined. It is important to recognise
from the outset that consideration and protection of human rights are part and parcel of law
enforcement in both jurisdictions. The research team was informed that the agencies concerned
carefully balance the rights of suspects and those of other stakeholders such as witnesses and
victims and take an appropriate course of action generally. The lack of cases concerning abuse
of power/process in both jurisdictions is one indication that the law enforcement communities
have been able to exercise their investigative powers appropriately. This was also confirmed by
judges interviewed. However, beyond actual law enforcement, some legislative changes are once
again recommended to enhance human rights protection and public confidence.
In relation to prosecution of organised crime, one of the key issues raised is a lack of specific
guidance for organised crime in both jurisdictions. Compared to England and Wales, the Public
Prosecution Service (PPS) in Northern Ireland does not produce legal guidance regularly. However,
the devolution of criminal justice and policing may require the PPS to create its own guidance in
the future, particularly in the areas of fiscal/excise fraud and civil recovery. Also, the Office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Ireland does not see an acute need to publish legal
guidance on organised crime. The research team takes the view that clearer guidance can
enhance consistency and transparency in decision making and also educate the general public.
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In terms of cross-border co-operation, all interviewees in the island of Ireland said that the state
of affairs is generally positive. Formal co-operation in evidential and other matters is executed
through measures such as the International Letters of Request and European Arrest Warrants.
An Garda Síochána and the PSNI also regularly conduct parallel investigations for crimes which
have cross-border dimensions. In addition, it was discovered through interviews that a more
informal approach to cross-border co-operation is facilitated regularly at the frontline level. Law
enforcement officers and prosecutors have their own contacts and can simply pick up a phone
to ask questions and exchange information. They also have regular face-to-face meetings. These
have helped them build mutual trust and working relationships. However, there is scope for
improvement in certain areas. They include facilitation of joint investigation teams and cross-
border surveillance as well as more proactive use of European agencies such as Eurojust. Creation
of a joint multi-agency task force on organised crime might also be considered in order to
strengthen the current efforts.
Criminal Proceedings and Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds
In both jurisdictions, there are certain arrangements under which a trial can be held without jury,
and these include organised crime cases. In Northern Ireland, the Justice and Security (Northern
Ireland) Act 2007 allows the DPP to issue a certificate that any trial on indictment be conducted
without a jury where the offences involve ‘proscribed’ organisations and he is satisfied that there
is a risk of administration of justice being impaired. In addition, there is a provision under section
44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 whereby an application may be made for a non-jury trial where
there is a risk of jury tampering. In Ireland, the Special Criminal Court (SCC) has jurisdiction over
‘scheduled offences’ set out in the Offences Against the State (Scheduled Offences) Order 1972.
The scope for ‘scheduled offences’ was extended by section 8 of the Criminal Justice
(Amendment) Act 2009 so that offences involving ‘criminal organisations’ (eg participating in
criminal organisations and committing offences for such organisations) will go to the SCC unless
the DPP directs otherwise. Although stakeholders recognised the benefits of these arrangements,
a greater degree of judicial scrutiny was recommended by the legal profession and civil society
organisations. There is also scope to strengthen the offence relating to jury/witness intimidation
in Northern Ireland so that it can tackle the culture of fear more effectively. In practice, it was
discovered that these measures are rarely used for organised crime offences.
Certain evidential matters have also been raised. Disclosure of evidence is one of the fundamental
principles in criminal proceedings, but this can be restricted to some extent under ‘public interest
immunity’ or ‘public interest privilege’. These restrictions are necessary to protect the source of
intelligence as well as the means and methods of intelligence gathering, and applications for
these seem to be quite common in both jurisdictions. The operation of judicial oversight provides
a safeguard against misuse, and generally a fair balance between the rights of defendants and
the interest of justice appears to be struck. However, the use of opinion evidence in Ireland raises
some concerns. The relevant legislation allows an opinion provided by a Garda officer in relation
to the existence of a criminal organisation to be admissible. While the use of such evidence does
not automatically result in a violation of one’s right to a fair trial provided that it is not the sole or
decisive evidence, it is recommended that such opinions should only be provided by higher-
ranking officers, similar to the legislation relating to terrorist organisations.
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In relation to sentencing, the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions argued that the
penalties imposed are rather lenient. In response, judges regarded sentences to be appropriate
as they have to take a variety of individual circumstances into consideration. While acknowledging
the importance of judicial independence and discretion in sentencing, the need for consistency
was highlighted by stakeholders. In this regard, the creation of sentencing guidelines on organised
crime is recommended. In Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice has initiated a Programme of
Action, and guidelines on certain offences are currently being developed. In Ireland, the
development of an arrangement similar to the Sentencing Council in England and Wales is
currently being examined by the judiciary. These are important developments.
Finally, the project examined the confiscation of criminal proceeds of organised crime in both
jurisdictions. Asset recovery in the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, is stipulated in
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 which provides for two types of proceedings: 1) confiscation
proceedings after a person is convicted of a criminal offence, and 2) civil recovery proceedings
which do not require criminal conviction. Ireland also has similar arrangements under the Criminal
Justice Act 1994 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, as amended. It should be pointed out
here that the Irish legislation is often used as a template for other States, including the United
Kingdom, as it predates their legislation. In any event, some concerns were expressed in relation
to civil recovery primarily because one does not have to be convicted of a crime and the civil
standard of proof (ie balance of probabilities) is used. The law enforcement agencies regard civil
recovery to be an appropriate measure for forfeiting criminal proceeds, and the Supreme Courts
in both jurisdictions have upheld the regimes as being constitutional and/or human rights
compliant. One interesting aspect of civil recovery in Northern Ireland is the role of the NCA.
Previously its predecessor, SOCA, took a lead role by confiscating over 95% of criminal proceeds
through civil recovery in this jurisdiction. The NCA cannot currently perform this function unless
the crimes relate to reserved matters (eg immigration and customs offences).  Given its
established expertise and experience, the research team recommends that the NCA should be
able to carry out this function for all forms of organised crime.
Prevention
The prevention of organised crime has become an important consideration in Northern Ireland
and Ireland, with both jurisdictions implementing a variety of actions intended to raise public
awareness, reduce demand for illicit goods and services, and restrict the opportunities for
organised criminals to profit. In Northern Ireland, the ‘Changing the Mindset’ campaign, which
aims to educate the general public about how their day-to-day activities can facilitate organised
crime, is an example of good practice. In Ireland, relevant agencies, including the Department of
Justice and Equality and An Garda Síochána, have also been intensifying their efforts in
community outreach, particularly targeting young people who are at risk of committing crimes or
purchasing illicit goods and services. However, the success of these measures can be called into
question as the general public in both jurisdictions continue to purchase illicit goods and services
provided by criminals. Although there are some examples of good practice in facilitating a multi-
agency approach to prevention, all relevant government Departments, including Education, Health
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and Social Development, should work closer together to devise a coherent and effective
prevention strategy, as organised crime is not merely a criminal justice problem. They could also
do more to reach out to the local/national media outlets, civil society groups, schools, and local
communities experiencing social exclusion and poverty where there is an increased risk of people
getting involved in criminal activities. Community policing is therefore important, and both
jurisdictions should continue their good efforts in this regard.
Measuring the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement
Setting appropriate benchmarks and performance indicators is important in measuring the
effectiveness of responses to organised crime. Both the law enforcement and political
communities have traditionally relied upon criminal justice statistics such as the number of
organised crime gangs dismantled and convicted, and the amount of drugs, cash, or illicit
property confiscated. While these statistics are important in highlighting the nature and extent of
organised crime, they do not necessarily provide accurate benchmarks to measure the
effectiveness of law enforcement. Given the clandestine and sophisticated nature of organised
crime, a large number of criminal activities are not detected in practice. The research team
suggests that all stakeholders should also pay attention to other indicators such as
poverty/economic hardship, social/cultural exclusion, education on organised crime provided to
children and young adults, and rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. Human rights
compliance should also be considered.
Conclusion
It is clear that both jurisdictions have been making efforts to implement effective action against
organised crime. There are numerous examples of good practice in law enforcement, including
cross-border co-operation, and these should be clearly and widely acknowledged. Both
jurisdictions also seem to take human rights seriously and strike a fair balance in protecting the
rights of defendants as well as of other stakeholders such as victims and witnesses. However, it
is also a fact that the general public continue to purchase illicit goods and services, and there
are a number of issues which should be addressed so as to maximise the effort of the law
enforcement communities in both jurisdictions. In the main, this requires the political community
and the general public to understand that organised crime needs to be treated seriously and to
have the confidence to give greater support to the law enforcement agencies so that they can
carry out their functions effectively and efficiently. Appropriate punishments must also be imposed
in order to send a clear message that organised crime is not acceptable. In addition, a strategy
which also addresses the supply–demand dynamics of organised crime is needed. All of these
require a truly multi-agency approach which sufficiently reflects the voices of the civil society
sector as well as the general public.
Key Recommendations
Substantive Criminal Law
• The piecemeal nature of the human trafficking legislation in the United Kingdom (including
Northern Ireland) should be rectified for clarity and consistency, and protection of victims
should have a solid legislative footing in both jurisdictions.
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• The UK legislative framework needs to be strengthened in relation to so-called ‘legal highs’.
In Ireland, the presumptive sentencing under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 should be
repealed.
• There is scope to strengthen the punishment regimes for fiscal/excise fraud in both
jurisdictions, and the relevant authorities might also examine a possibility of penalising the
purchase of illegal fuel, cigarettes, and alcohol.
Criminal Investigation
• In order to strengthen a multi-agency approach to organised crime, including the development
of a more comprehensive strategy, Ireland should consider establishing an arrangement
similar to the OCTF in Northern Ireland.
• More rigorous judicial oversight of the use of special investigative techniques is desirable in
both jurisdictions. In addition, comprehensive legislation which covers all aspects of these
techniques should be enacted in Ireland.
• Both governments should continue their efforts in community policing to build a good rapport
with the local communities, including ethnic minority groups.
• More adequate financial, human, and other resources should be allocated to the relevant
agencies in both jurisdictions. In this regard, proactive use of confiscated criminal proceeds,
as well as external funding, should be facilitated.
• Regular human rights training should be implemented for law enforcement agencies in both
jurisdictions. A dedicated human rights legal adviser should also be appointed within An
Garda Síochána in Ireland.
Prosecution
• Specific charging/prosecution guidelines on organised crime should be developed in both
jurisdictions to maintain transparency and consistency in decision making.
• In Northern Ireland, prosecutors should be assigned to all cases involving organised crime
from an early stage of investigation.
• It would be desirable if clear legislative provision were made in Ireland, as in the UK, for
granting immunity from prosecution and other measures in order to secure assistance from
offenders in criminal investigations.
Cross-Border Co-operation
• The Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975 and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction Act) 1976 should be
should be amended to include organised crime offences, subject to greater harmonisation
being achieved between the two jurisdictions in relation to suspects’ rights, such as the right
to the presence of a lawyer during police interviews.
• Ireland might consider opting in to some aspects of the Schengen Agreement, such as article
40 which allows cross-border surveillance. It should also make more proactive use of Joint
Investigation Teams.
• Both governments might consider establishing a joint multi-agency task force on organised
crime to further promote mutual trust and closer co-operation.
• The relevant EU agencies such as Eurojust should be utilised more proactively.
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Criminal Proceedings
• The Criminal Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 should be amended to
strengthen judicial scrutiny over the DPP’s decision as to the use of non-jury trial in connection
with offences involving proscribed organisations.
• The punishment regime for jury tampering and witness intimidation should be strengthened
in the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland.
• In order to enhance public confidence, it is desirable that cases should only be sent to the
SCC after consideration, on the merits of each case, whether or not the ordinary courts are
adequate, and that there should be a mechanism for judicial scrutiny in respect of all cases
that are sent to this court.
• The provision of opinion evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2006, as amended by the
Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, should be restricted to high-ranking Garda officers.
• More organised crime offences should be made referable for unduly lenient sentences in both
jurisdictions.
• Clearer sentencing guidelines on organised crime should be developed in both jurisdictions.
Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds
• Northern Ireland should allow the High Court to be able to issue confiscation orders against
assets held abroad, in line with developments in England and Wales under the Crime and
Courts Act 2013.
• The NCA should be able to exercise civil recovery functions for all forms of organised crime
in Northern Ireland. This is also desirable to maintain a multi-agency approach.
• In Ireland, the legislation on confiscation of criminal proceeds (Criminal Justice Act 1994),
which allows for enhanced confiscation for drugs offences but not other types of organised
crime, might be amended.
Prevention of Organised Crime
• Confiscated criminal proceeds should be effectively used for prevention of organised crime
in both jurisdictions, particularly education and awareness raising among the general public,
so as to address the demand side of illicit goods and services. More should be done to
acquire co-operation of local/national media as well as the non-governmental sector.
• All relevant government departments, such as those dealing with education, social
development, and health, should work together more closely to devise a comprehensive and
coherent prevention strategy against organised crime in both jurisdictions.
Measuring Effectiveness of Action Against Organised Crime
• Instead of focusing too much on law enforcement statistics, the relevant agencies should
also analyse the broader social contexts which fuel the demand for illicit goods and services.
Other indicators such as poverty/economic hardship, social/cultural exclusion, education on
organised crime provided to children and young adults, and rehabilitation and reintegration
of offenders should be carefully considered. Human rights compliance should also be
incorporated as this will help boost public confidence in law enforcement.
10 |  AHRC Research Project
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 Section 1: Understanding 
Organised Crime
1.1 The Nature and Extent of Organised Crime
 Organised crime is an increasingly dynamic and complex phenomenon which poses a significant
threat to the safety and prosperity of Northern Ireland and Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the latest
OCTF threat assessment has identified a range of crimes prevalent in this jurisdiction, such as
armed robbery and cash-in-transit attacks, tiger kidnapping, drugs offences, currency
counterfeiting, excise and tax fraud, human trafficking, and money laundering.1 These crimes
are carried out by fluid, organised crime groups, both in terms of conventional criminals and
current or former members of paramilitary organisations, with members changing depending on
the skills needed for a particular enterprise. They are also good at adapting to the environment
in which they operate by changing the types of crime they are involved in, developing new
expertise, and exploiting perceived weaknesses and loopholes.2 For example, the economic
recession was said to have encouraged criminal groups to shift their focus to cigarette smuggling
due to an increasing demand for cheap tobacco products in comparison to illegal drugs which
generally cost more to purchase. Although the clandestine nature of organised crime makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to present an accurate picture, the available statistical
information provides some indications about its scope. In 2012, the PSNI estimated that there
were between 160 and 180 organised crime groups operating in Northern Ireland.3 In the same
period, 116 of those were said to have been frustrated, disrupted, or dismantled.4 In addition,
drug seizures increased by 14.2%, and cash seizures were also up by £379,1325 compared to
the previous year.
In Ireland, organised crime also covers a wide range of activities, including drug trafficking, illegal
trafficking of people, and fraud.  It also includes other crimes such as high-tech crime,
counterfeiting, serious armed robbery, organised vehicle crime, tiger kidnaping, and others.6
These are in line with the latest EU Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment published by
Europol which highlights in particular the prominence of drug trafficking, economic crime such
as fraud, and the trafficking or smuggling of human beings.7 Annual figures released by An Garda
Síochána show that its Organised Crime Unit was involved in 387 operations against organised
crime groups in 2012. It also seized controlled drugs worth €4,591,200 in 2012, almost four times
more than the previous year.8
It has been widely accepted by stakeholders that there is a strong cross-border element in the
activities of organised crime gangs in the island of Ireland. The existence of a land border does
not impede the operations of organised criminal networks, and in many cases it is used to their
advantage. Officers from An Garda Síochána and Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs stated that
1 OCTF, Annual Report & Threat Assessment 2013 (‘OCTF Annual Report 2013’).
2 ibid. 
3 ibid.
4 PSNI, End of Year Performance Report to Northern Ireland Policing Board 2012/13, 14.  
5 ibid. 
6 Department of Justice and Equality, What is Organised Crime <http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Organised_crime> accessed 20 February 2014.  
7 Europol, Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2013, 6. 
8 An Garda Síochána, An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2012, 3. 
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traditional cross-border offences such as cigarette smuggling and the laundering of diesel have
increased in prominence recently. According to the Irish Tobacco Manufacturers’ Advisory
Committee, almost 20% of cigarettes consumed in Ireland in 2012 were illegally obtained,
compared to less than 9% in 2007.9 Criminals involved in smuggling operations are said to be
based mainly around the border on both sides, allowing them to co-ordinate efficiently. These
crimes have also received considerable scrutiny in Northern Ireland in recent times, culminating
in a special report of the Parliamentary Northern Ireland Affairs Committee.10 It is noteworthy
that between 2012 and 2013, over 820,000 litres of illegal fuel with an estimated value of £480,000
were seized by HMRC.11 Alarmingly, a recent survey on organised crime conducted in Northern
Ireland reveals that only 20% of the respondents (1,154 in total) associated fiscal/excise fraud
with organised crime. 12
All interviewees representing different organisations have confirmed that there is a clear link
between terrorism and organised crime in both jurisdictions.13 Paramilitaries are involved in
organised crime either to finance their terrorist activities or simply to enrich themselves. On the
one hand, Republicans are known to engage in extortion, money laundering through money
service bureaus, and fuel/tobacco smuggling to finance their terrorist activities.14 On the other
hand, Loyalists seem to be interested in maintaining an expensive lifestyle by, for example, getting
involved in drug trafficking. The presence of paramilitary groups raises a number of problems for
investigation as many operations have security risks, especially when utilising special investigative
techniques such as surveillance, CHIS, and controlled delivery. Understanding these and others
relevant issues is undoubtedly useful in identifying future trends and implementing appropriate
action. In addition, a clear message that organised crime fuels terrorism in the island of Ireland
must be effectively communicated to the general public to discourage them from purchasing illicit
goods and services.
It was also highlighted by stakeholders that some tensions exist between various groups as they
try to monopolise particular markets in order to maximise profits. This sometimes results in turf
wars and violence, and the general public are often affected. This seems to have facilitated a
‘culture of fear’, which is particularly evident in Northern Ireland dating back from the time of the
Troubles when paramilitary groups engaged in a variety of intimidation tactics. Given the strong
nexus between organised crime and terrorism in the island of Ireland, it seems reasonable to
argue that this culture of fear is still a serious problem. It should be highlighted in this regard that
68% of the respondents in the aforementioned survey believed that organised crime could lead
to fear in the community.15 As will be shown below, this culture of fear has hampered the
implementation of effective action against organised crime in both jurisdictions.
The picture is further complicated by the involvement of foreign criminal groups such as Chinese,
East European, and West African gangs, although their presence is not as great as in other parts
of Great Britain. A similar picture has emerged in Ireland. Chinese Criminal Groups have had a
strong presence in cannabis cultivation in Northern Ireland, whereas the involvement of
Vietnamese nationals has been recognised in Ireland.16 Many of the home-based criminals in
both jurisdictions are said to have forged alliance with these and other criminals located in States
12 |  AHRC Research Project
9 See ITMAC, Tobacco Market <http://www.itmac.ie/media-centre/facts-figures/tobacco-market/> accessed 28 February 2014. See also the Cigarettes
Consumption Survey 2012 published by Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs, which found that 14% of all smokers were classified as having an illegal pack.      
10 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, First Special Report, Fuel Laundering and Smuggling in Northern Ireland, Third Report of Session (2012) (‘Report on Fuel
Laundering and Smuggling’). 
11 OCTF Annual Report 2013, 12.  
12 Department of Justice, Views on Organised Crime: Findings from the January 2013 Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey (January 2013), 4 (‘Omnibus Survey’).
13 See also, Independent Monitoring Commission (2011), Twenty-Sixth and Final Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004-2011: Changes, Impact
and Lessons, for a summary of paramilitary involvement in organised crime in Northern Ireland including cross-border crime.
14 PSNI and An Garda Síochána, Cross-Border Organised Crime Assessment 2012, 5 (‘Cross-Border Organised Crime Assessment 2012’). 
15 Omnibus Survey, 4.  
16 Cross-Border Organised Crime Assessment 2012, 8. 
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such as the Netherlands, Spain, Malaysia, and Cambodia to facilitate drug trafficking and tobacco
smuggling.17 These foreign groups pose additional challenges due to cultural and language
barriers, and this requires the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions to adopt
appropriate strategies.
1.2 International/Regional Legal Definitions
Perhaps the first step in facilitating an appropriate response is to have better understanding of
what ‘organised crime’ really is. Adoption of legal or working definitions can be useful in this
regard, and this has been happening at various levels of governance. At the international level,
the Organised Crime Convention18 is the most important international instrument relating to
organised crime. It does not provide a definition of organised crime. Instead, article 2 describes
how ‘organised crime’ should be understood as a ‘serious crime’ committed by an ‘organised
criminal group’:
‘Organised criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance
with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit.19
The Convention defines ‘a structured group’ as a group that is not randomly formed for the
immediate commission of an offence but does not need to have formally defined roles for its
members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure.20 Moreover, a ‘serious crime’
shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at
least 4 years or a more serious penalty.21
A definition of organised crime is also set out in the EU Council Framework Decision on the Fight
against Organised Crime.22 Article 1 defines a criminal organisation as:
A structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two
persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are
punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at
least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit.
The same article also defines a ‘structured association’ similarly to the Organised Crime
Convention. When comparing the two instruments, it is apparent that they both define ‘criminal
17 ibid 5 and 22.  
18 2225 UNTS 209. The United Kingdom ratified this instrument in February 2006, and Ireland did the same in June 2010.  
19 Art 2(a).
20 Art 2(c).
21 Art 2(b).
22 [2008] OJ L 300/42.  
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offences’ as those being committed for financial or material benefit. Generally speaking, what
distinguishes organised crime from ordinary crime is the generation of longer-term, as opposed
to immediate, profit or benefit. This means that criminal proceeds are diversified and reinvested
in legal/illegal enterprises for generation of sustained income. In this regard, organised criminal
groups are comparable to legitimate corporations and businesses.
1.3 National Definitions
In United Kingdom, there is no legislation which provides a definition of organised crime. Instead,
the law enforcement community uses the working definition adopted by SOCA:23
The definition of organised crime is individuals, normally working with others,
with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing
basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and
benefits those involved.24
In Northern Ireland, the OCTF has used the term ‘organised crime gang’ when providing a similar
definition to the one provided by SOCA:
An organised crime gang consists of individuals, normally working with others,
with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing
basis.25
To begin with, this similarity suggests that a UK-wide approach, rather than a regional approach,
is regarded as important in relation to organised crime to facilitate unified/consistent responses.
Having different working definitions within all parts of the country could potentially undermine
this. The OCTF goes further in defining a ‘serious crime’ as a crime which causes or has the
potential to cause significant harm. In order to assist the interpretation of this, the OCTF makes
reference to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Schedule 1 to this Act includes offences such as drug
trafficking, people trafficking, arms trafficking, and child sex offences. In any event, both
definitions are much broader than the one presented in the Organised Crime Convention as the
phrase ‘normally working with others’ applies also to those organised criminals who work alone.
Further, unlike the SOCA definition, the OCTF one does not contain the element of ‘benefits’,
leaving a possibility of its application to a wide variety of offences.
When asked whether the UK definitions were fit for purpose, many interviewees stated that they
were good working definitions, although some expressed a view that it might be difficult for the
general public to understand them. This is an important point as misconceptions may affect
14 |  AHRC Research Project
23 On Monday 7 October 2013, SOCA was replaced by the NCA. 
24 Home Office, Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime: Home Office Organised Crime Strategy (2011), 8.
25 OCTF, The Northern Ireland Organised Crime Strategy 2012-2014, 4. 
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effective prevention of organised crime and public confidence in law enforcement. In relation to
the legal definitions under the Organised Crime Convention or the EU Framework Decision on
Organised Crime, most of those interviewed in Northern Ireland said they were not aware of them.
Judges in Belfast raised an important point that these definitions are not really relevant unless
they are incorporated into domestic law. This firstly demonstrates that the relevant international
and European standards are not necessarily communicated to, or understood by, the law
enforcement community in Northern Ireland. Those who were aware of the definitions have not
studied them in depth nor use them in their work. Secondly, as the UK definitions do not really
reflect the ones provided by these instruments, it seems clear that the UK and Northern Irish
governments do not take these standards seriously enough.
The benefit of having a legal definition is that it can provide clarity in law enforcement as all
agencies will refer to it. In other words, it can facilitate common understanding. However, it has
its downside. Certain criminal groups may not fit neatly into such a definition, and this may have
repercussions in terms of their identification. This concern was expressed by many interviewees.
Further, organised crime normally carries heavier penalties due to the fact that the involvement
of sophisticated criminal groups makes their operations more successful and dangerous. Inability
to identify a particular group under a legal definition, therefore, can have a negative impact on
punishment.
In practice, it was discovered that a lack of definition has not caused any difficulty in Northern
Ireland. The PSNI uses a mechanism known as CRIMNET which provides information on
organised criminal groups. Consequently, it does not need to focus too much on the definitions.
Its ability to address organised crime without a definition was also recognised by the UK National
Member of Eurojust. Even then, the law enforcement community has not encountered any
difficulty distinguishing organised crime from ordinary crimes. Judges also stated that it was not
really necessary to have a definition of organised crime, as crimes are punished sufficiently under
relevant legislation.
Another important aspect is international co-operation. It may be argued that different perceptions
of organised crime can make it difficult to achieve this. However, our research has revealed that
a lack of a legal definition in Northern Ireland has not undermined cross-border co-operation with
Ireland. Stakeholders from both jurisdictions believed that variations were cosmetic and did not
cause a problem for cross-border co-operation. The nature and extent of organised crime, rather
than the definitions, would dictate the types of responses to be implemented. Once again, what
is important to the frontline officers is to have a broader and shared understanding of organised
crime/criminal groups.
Finally, when asked whether membership of mafia-type criminal organisations should also be
criminalised, Justice McCloskey saw some advantages in this because of perceived changes to
the nature of criminal activities in Northern Ireland. A similar opinion was expressed by the UK
National Member of Eurojust and Detective Chief Superintendent Roy McComb, Head of the
PSNI’s Organised Crime Branch, highlighting that this can send a strong message to the general
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public that it is not acceptable to be part of a criminal organisation. Criminalisation of membership
has been implemented, for example, in the United States under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and this can be used to target those ranked high in its criminal
organisations who may not directly commit organised crime. However, one defence lawyer in
Northern Ireland stated that criminalisation of membership is potentially dangerous as it is difficult
to clearly define what ‘a criminal group’ and ‘membership’ are in practice, with the result that the
interpretation and application of the law could become unduly broad and uncertain.
Unlike Great Britain and Northern Ireland, there is a legal definition of ‘criminal organisation’ in
Ireland. Under Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, it is defined as:
a structured group, however organised, that—
(a) is composed of 3 or more persons acting in concert,
(b) is established over a period of time,
(c) has as its main purpose or main activity the commission or facilitation
of one or more serious offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit.
Moreover ‘a structured group’ is a group which:
(a) is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of a single offence,
and
(b) does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity
of its membership or a developed structure.
Finally, a ‘serious offence’ is to carry a minimum of 4 years’ imprisonment. In explaining his
decision to amend the 2006 Bill to include ‘Part 7 Organised Crime,’ the then Minister for Justice,
Equality and Defence stated that the amendments were necessary in order to comply with the
Organised Crime Convention.26 Here, the willingness to abide by the international standards is
clearly evident in Ireland.
The definition was subsequently amended by the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009:
‘criminal organisation’ means a structured group, however organised, that has
as its main purpose or activity the commission or facilitation of a serious
offence;
‘Structured group’ means a group of 3 or more persons, which is not randomly
16 |  AHRC Research Project
26 Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights Debate, ‘Criminal Justice Bill 2004’ (10 May 2006). 
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formed for the immediate commission of a single offence, and the involvement
in which by 2 or more of those persons is with a view to their acting in concert;
for the avoidance of doubt, a structured group may exist notwithstanding the
absence of all or any of the following:
(a) formal rules or formal membership, or any formal roles for those involved
in the group;
(b) any hierarchical or leadership structure;
(c) continuity of involvement by persons in the group.
Most notable in the amended definition is the removal of a phrase ‘a financial or other material
benefit’. This makes the Irish definition quite wide in scope, similar to the Northern Irish version,
and enables the use of special powers and arrangements to be used for a wide variety of offences.
In the Irish context, the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 allows the following special
measures to be taken:
1) The use of the Special Criminal Court.27
3) Higher sentences for organised crime offences.28
4) Ability of the court to draw inferences from failure to answer questions,
failure to account for movements, actions or associations.29 
5) Admissibility of opinion evidence on the existence and operations of
criminal gangs by Garda officers.30
Interviews with officers from An Garda Síochána and prosecutors highlighted their familiarity with
the legal definition of organised crime under the Irish legislation, with many of them confirming
that they use it frequently while carrying out their roles. Although most of them were not familiar
with the definitions set out in international and European instruments, those who did were aware
that the Irish legal definition was quite similar. A representative from the Irish Council for Civil
Liberties (ICCL) raised an important point that the definition could institutionalise a popular notion
of organised crime and also be used to justify quite draconian crime control.31 A similar view was
expressed by the Irish Human Rights Commission prior to the enactment of the 2009 Act.32 On
this point, the law enforcement community in Ireland disagreed, stating that they were generally
able to distinguish organised crime from ordinary crime and apply the definition appropriately.
This was also confirmed by a High Court Judge in Ireland who noted that the law enforcement
agencies have not abused the definition. There was a consensus, though, that the wider definition
could indeed make it easier to prosecute those who are not directly involved in organised
criminality but are involved in connected supporting activities such as transporting illicit goods
or handling/laundering money.
Another important issue raised by the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions in Ireland is that it
is often difficult to prove a connection between the existence of a criminal organisation, which
27 s 8.
28 ss 6 and 12.
29 s 9.
30 s 7.
31 See also ICCL, Combating Organised Crime and Respecting the Rule of Law: Human Rights Based Alternatives to the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 2009,
10-11.
32 Irish Human Rights Commission, Observations on the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 2009, 12.  
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can be established by the opinion evidence of a member of An Garda Síochána,33 and the proof
that the accused participated in the activities of the organisation in practice. For this reason, there
is a preference to prosecute for substantive offences such as drug trafficking as this enhances
the chance of successful prosecutions. A defence lawyer in Ireland also pointed out that there
was never any immediate need for organised crime legislation as criminal gangs are mostly
arrested for stand-alone crimes. All these points raise an important question as to whether it is
actually necessary to create a specific offence of membership of a criminal group in Northern
Ireland. In addition, the ICCL has cogently argued that, as the organised crime legislation is not
relied upon regularly in Ireland, it should be repealed in order to enhance legal certainty in criminal
law.
In conclusion, the definitions of organised crime do not seem to be overtly significant when it
comes to actual law enforcement. All agencies have a shared understanding of what organised
crime is and are able to distinguish it from ordinary crime. This has also been confirmed by judges
in both jurisdictions.
18 |  AHRC Research Project
33 Criminal Justice Act 2006, s 71B, as inserted by Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, s 7. 
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Section 2:
Legislative Frameworks 
on Substantive Offences34
2.1 Human Trafficking
2.1.1 International/Regional Standards
Human Trafficking is considered an offence under international law, most notably by the Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children attached
to the Organised Crime Convention.35 This instrument is important as it introduced a three-
pronged policy—‘3Ps obligations’—focusing on prosecution, protection, and prevention.
Regionally, an important instrument is the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking of
Human Beings 2005,36 which particularly enhances the protection aspect.37 Another relevant
trafficking instrument is the EU Directive on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings and Protecting Its Victims (EU Trafficking Directive).38 This Directive is an attempt to tighten
up the EU’s action on trafficking and contains binding obligations relating to approximate
legislation, penalties, and prevention, as well as enhanced assistance to victims.
2.1.2 National Legislation
With respect to national approaches to human trafficking, legislation relating to human trafficking
is organised quite differently in the United Kingdom and Ireland. In the United Kingdom (including
Northern Ireland), there is no single statute applicable to trafficking. Two key statutes are the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act
2004, which apply to trafficking for both sexual and labour exploitation with a maximum penalty
of 14 years’ imprisonment. Another relevant instrument is the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
which prohibits slavery and forced labour in line with article 4 of the European Convention on
Human Rights 1950 (ECHR).39 In order to comply with the EU Trafficking Directive, particularly
the prosecution of UK nationals who traffic people elsewhere in the world and internal trafficking,
amendments have been made in England and Wales through the Protection of Freedoms Act
2012, and in Northern Ireland through the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013. One issue
which needs to be addressed in relation to human trafficking legislation in the United
Kingdom is its piecemeal nature. Instead of having several statutes covering this crime, it
is desirable to have a single legislation for clarity and consistency. The research team
welcomes the introduction of a Modern Slavery Bill before Parliament in December 2013,
as it aims to consolidate the existing statutes on trafficking and slavery. It also proposes to
increase the punishment to life imprisonment. A parallel development can be seen in
Northern Ireland where the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and
Support for Victims) Bill40 is currently moving through the Northern Ireland Assembly as a
34 For the purpose of this report, the research team will concentrate on three important forms of organised crime highly relevant to both jurisdictions: human
trafficking, drug offences, and fiscal/excise fraud such as cigarette smuggling and fuel laundering.
35 2237 UNTS 319.
36 ETS No. 197. 
37 Art 1.
38 [2011] OJ L 203/1.
39 ETS No. 5.   
40 A private Member’s Bill by Lord Morrow.  
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part of the legislative process. It is important that the relationship between these Bills is
clarified so as to prevent the implementation of fragmented responses to human trafficking.
It should be noted in this regard that the Minister of Justice for Northern Ireland issued a
consultation in January 2014.41
In contrast, Ireland already has enacted a specific statute to combat human trafficking. The
Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 provides for the definition of trafficking in line with the
Trafficking Protocol and the Council of Europe Convention and penalties of up to life imprisonment
and an unlimited fine. It is therefore evident that the legislative framework is more advanced in
Ireland than in the United Kingdom, and this is an example of good practice. However, it has
been pointed out by the law enforcement community that the definition of trafficking is not always
well understood by the general public. It was also highlighted that the definition of forced labour
was inadequate. The latter issue has been remedied by the recent amendment to the 2008 Act
which has added a definition of forced labour.42 
A major shortcoming in the current human trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Ireland
is that it does not contain provisions on protection of victims of trafficking, although both
governments provide certain protection including reflection periods, medical/psychological
assistance, and subsistence outside of the legislative frameworks in accordance with the
international and European standards.43 A lack of legal basis can be problematic from the point
of view of clarity and accountability, and the importance of having legislation on protection was
stressed by the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA)
established by the Council of Europe Convention.44 While the Minister of Justice for Northern
Ireland previously expressed his intention to bring forward secondary legislation to put protection
on a legislative footing, this was suspended due to the introduction of Lord Morrow’s Bill.
However, it is encouraging to note that the Bill provide for a range of provisions for assistance
and support in Parts 2 and 3. Ireland also has proposed legislation—the Immigration, Residence
and Protection Bill—introducing rules on the identification of victims, reflection period(s), and
residence permits. These are examples of good practice and should be followed through.
However, the Modern Slavery Bill does not contain any provisions on protection.45 The research
team recommends that the UK government seriously considers putting protection on a
legislative footing.
2.2 Drug Offences
2.2.1 International/Regional Standards
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances 198846 is the primary international drug-control treaty currently in force. It includes a
range of measures such as article 3 which obliges States to ban illegal possession, purchase, or
cultivation. Various parts of the Convention are devoted to fighting organised crime by mandating
co-operation in tracing and seizing drug-related assets. Under EU law, the chief instrument in
combating drug offences is the Council Framework Decision Laying Down Minimum Provisions
20 |  AHRC Research Project
41 The closing date for consultation is 15 April 2014.
42 Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013.  
43 National Referral Mechanism in the UK, including Northern Ireland, and Administrative Immigration Arrangements for the Protection of Victim of Human Trafficking
in Ireland.  
44 GRETA, Report Concerning the Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking of Human Beings by United Kingdom
(September 2012), 87 and Report Concerning the Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking of Human Beings by Ireland
(September 2013), 63.
45 See also Immigrant Council of Ireland, Comments on the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Bill 2013 for a discussion of the limitations of current
arrangements for protecting victims of human trafficking in Ireland.
46 1582 UNTS 95.  
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on the Constituent Elements of Criminal Acts and Penalties in the Field of Illicit Drug Trafficking,47
which, like the EU Trafficking Directive, encourages Member States to adopt a common EU
approach through approximation of national criminal laws and procedures. In this regard, article
4 requires that drug offences are punishable by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties
and should include a maximum penalty of at least 10 years where the offence was committed
within the framework of a criminal organisation.48
2.2.2 National Legislation
On paper, the UK legislative framework for prosecuting drug offences seems sufficient both in
terms of the definition of offences, the penalties they attract and the provisions for the recovery
of assets gained from the illicit trade in drugs. The primary legislation is the Misuse of Drugs Act
1971, which defines a series of offences, including unlawful supply, intent to supply, import or
export (all these are collectively known as 'trafficking' offences), unlawful production and
possession. Each offence is rated against a classification system which is used to set an
appropriate penalty. The maximum sentence for supplying, importing, or exporting Class A drugs
is life imprisonment, and in relation to Classes B and C drugs, it is 14 years’ imprisonment. The
maximum sentence for possession is 7 years’ imprisonment for Class A drugs, reduced to 5 years
for Class B drugs and 2 years for Class C drugs. The Drug Trafficking Act 1994 is also an
important piece of legislation for recovering the proceeds of drug trafficking offences. It allows
for the seizure of assets and incomes of any person found guilty of drug trafficking, even if they
do not come from the proceeds of this crime. Finally, the Drugs Act 2005 introduced a provision
for the reversal of the burden of proof in cases where suspects are found in possession of a
quantity of drugs greater than that which would be required for personal use. Together, the
legislation for drug offences seems to be in conformity with the aforementioned 1988 UN
Convention and the EU Framework Decision.
While the law on drug offences is the same in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland due
to the fact that the misuse of drugs is a reserved matter, there are discrepancies in terms of
sentencing. According to the research conducted by the Northern Ireland Assembly, more people
were given immediate custodial sentences for drug offences in England and Wales than Northern
Ireland, and the Northern Irish courts has imposed more suspended sentences than the English or
Welsh courts.49 These variations presumably come from different approaches to sentencing adopted
in these jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council recently published Drug
Offences: Definitive Guidelines in 2012, which is utilised by English and Welsh judges to facilitate
consistency in sentencing. The Northern Irish courts are not bound by this and often refer to so-
called guideline cases in reaching decisions. In the recent case of DPP’s Reference (No 2) of 2013,50
for example, the Court of Appeal argued that some aspects in the Definitive Guidelines, such as
setting starting points and ranges depending on the category of harm caused and the nature of the
role of offenders, might prevent the judge from exercising his/her discretion in finding the right
sentence. While the adoption of different approaches is an inevitable consequence of devolution,
it can simultaneously increase the possibility of forum shopping whereby criminals concentrate their
activities in jurisdictions where the punishment regimes are weaker. This is also relevant to other
forms of organised crime and should be considered carefully by all stakeholders.
47 [2004] OJ L335/8.
48 Art 4(3).  
49 Northern Ireland Assembly, Sentencing Comparisons in Northern Ireland and England and Wales (April 2012), 21.  It is important to note that the figures were
obtained in 2006. However, a similar trend can be seen in the figures obtained in 2009. In that year, 14.2% of those convicted of drug offences received
suspended sentences in Northern Ireland, whereas the figure is lower at 5.5% in England and Wales. See Ministry of Justice, Sentencing Statistics: England &
Wales 2009, and Department of Justice, Northern Ireland Conviction and Sentencing Statistics 2009.  
50 [2013] NICA 28. 
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When asked about the effectiveness of the legislative framework for drug offences in Northern
Ireland, including the levels of available penalties, all interviewees answered in the affirmative.
However, many PSNI officers stated that the cross-border nature of the trade in drugs raised
major difficulties for law enforcement. Organised criminals pay little attention to the border with
Ireland as noted above, and most of the drugs that enter Northern Ireland tend to be passing
through to larger markets in the UK. Consequently, the PSNI officers described the importance
of having effective systems for cross-border co-operation in place, and these measures will be
discussed in detail below.
In Ireland, the primary legislation is the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977. This has been subsequently
amended by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1984, the Criminal Justice Act 1999, the Criminal Justice
Act 2006, and the Criminal Justice Act 2007. The 1977 Act is supplemented by the Criminal
Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010, which covers substances which are not specifically
proscribed under the 1977 Act. These Acts define the penalties for unlawful production,
possession, and supply of drugs. Unlike the United Kingdom, Ireland does not have a similar
classification system, but instead bases the penalties on the values and quantities of the drugs.
Generally, tariffs for possession of illegal drugs in Ireland appear to be similar to the United
Kingdom, although in Ireland the courts have much more freedom in setting them. In terms of
other offences, under section 15A of the 1977 Act, as amended, it is an offence to be in
possession of controlled drugs with a market value of over €13,000 for sale or supply. The
penalties for this offence have been amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1999 and the Criminal
Justice Act 2007, and now any person found guilty can face up to life imprisonment and a fine.
Further, where the market value of the drugs is €13,000 or more, a person faces a minimum
sentence of 10 years, save in exceptional or special circumstances. Similar penalties apply to
any person convicted of importing drugs with a value of €13,000 or more.51
Various issues have been raised by stakeholders in relation to the Irish legislative framework on
drug offences. Garda officers, prosecutors, and defence lawyers all agreed that a classification
system was desirable in Ireland for clarity and coherence. They pointed to the fact that a person
found to be in possession of cannabis with a market value of €13,000 could attract the same
custodial sentence as possession of €13,000 worth of heroin or cocaine. A question was also
raised as to the reasonableness of applying presumptive sentencing of 10 years for possession
of drugs with an estimated street value of over €13,000 for the reason that such a sentence
disregards the need for individualisation of punishment (taking into account offenders’ personal
circumstances) and proportionality in sentencing.52 Defence lawyers and the ICCL additionally
highlighted an undesirable consequence of overcrowded prisons because of the mandatory
sentences. Some of these concerns are shared by the Law Reform Commission in its report on
mandatory sentences, including those relating to drug offences, published in June 2013.53 After
a careful analysis of legislation, jurisprudence, other State practices, and scholarly publications,
it made an observation that the presumptive sentencing was not effective as it did not serve as
strong deterrence.54 It also recognised that the market value of €13,000 was prioritised at the
expense of other relevant factors such as ‘the role, motive and the state of mind of offenders’,
resulting in inconsistent and disproportionate punishments and affecting the principle of justice.55
22 |  AHRC Research Project
51 Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, ss 15B and 27, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2006, s 84.
52 Department of Justice and Equality, White Paper on Crime, Third Discussion Document: Overview of Submissions Received (April 2011), 39 (‘Third Discussion
Document’).  
53 Law Reform Commission, Mandatory Sentences (June 2013).
54 ibid 175.
55 ibid 175-176, 178, 181.
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Consequently, the Commission recommended that presumptive sentencing under the 1977 Act
should be repealed.56 The research team regards this as a reasonable recommendation and
supports reform in this regard.
An interesting area that has developed in recent times is the status of so-called ‘legal highs’ in
both jurisdictions. The recent OCTF Annual Report and Threat Assessment states that the
emergence of legal highs and new psychoactive substances has posed challenges for law
enforcement authorities.57 These substances are often purchased from ‘head shops’ and internet
sites. If the internet servers are located abroad, this makes criminal investigations more
complicated. Also, when some of these substances are made illegal, suppliers are very quick to
advertise their replacements. In addition, classification of ‘legal highs’ for the purpose of
criminalisation is not straightforward given the amount of time it takes to carefully analyse their
contents and effects. Interviews with law enforcement officers in Northern Ireland revealed that
these have been causing significant difficulties in detecting and preventing the use of such
substances. In the United Kingdom, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 also regulates legal highs. An
important amendment was made through the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011,
which allows the Home Secretary to issue temporary class drug orders for substances which are
not appropriately classified previously, after consulting the Advisory Council on the Misuse of
Drugs. The government then has up to 12 months to place these substances under permanent
control under the 1971 Act.58 Importation, exportation, production, and supply of substances
placed under these orders will attract the maximum penalties of 14 years’ imprisonment and an
unlimited fine on indictment.
In Ireland, the Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 introduced a ban on the
selling, advertising, and distributing psychoactive products. The legislation allows the law
enforcement authorities to effectively close head shops who continue to sell such products. This
may have important cross-border implications as people from Ireland can travel to similar shops
in the Northern Ireland and purchase psychoactive products without fear of prosecution. Similar
legislation on closing head shops does not exist in the United Kingdom. Therefore, central
government should consider adopting a similar approach to Ireland on this issue. It is worth
mentioning here that the Home Office launched a review of ‘legal highs’ in December 2013,59
and the research team welcomes this development.
2.3 Fiscal/Excise Fraud
2.3.1 International/Regional Standards
As there is no international treaty relating to fiscal fraud, the United Kingdom and Ireland must
look to the EU for guidance. The primary instrument relating to customs and excise arrangements
is the Council Directive Concerning the General Arrangements for Excise Duty.60 This instrument
lays down general arrangements for excise duty to be levied on goods including energy products,
alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and manufactured tobacco. It also sets out the requirement for
Member States to incorporate a new computerised holding, movement, and duty point system
56 See also Irish Penal Reform Trust, Position Paper 3: Mandatory Sentencing (August 2013). 
57 OCTF Annual Report 2013, 26.  
58 See ACMD, Temporary Class Drug Order on Benzofury and NBOMe Compounds - Letter to the Home Secretary (June 2013).
59 Home Office, Terms of Reference for a Review into Legislative Options to Tackle New Psychoactive Substances (December 2013).
60 [2008] OJ L 9/12 (2008).
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as a replacement for the old paper-based means of recording customs and excise transactions.61
Subsequently, a recommendation to introduce an online system to capture and monitor the
movement of excise goods was agreed by all Member States in June 2013.62 In relation to
administrative co-operation among Member States, the Convention on Mutual Assistance and
Co-operation between Customs Administrations (Naples II),63 the Council Regulation on
Administrative Co-operation and Combating Fraud in the Field of Value Added Tax64 and the
Council Directive on Administrative Co-operation in the Field of Taxation65 are pertinent. In
addition, the European Commission recently drafted the ‘Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight
against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion’ in 2012.66 This highlights the current EU measures being
taken and proposes recommendations for the future, including better information exchange,
police co-operation, and enhanced tax compliance through legislative and other means.
2.3.2 National Legislation
The prohibition and prosecution of fiscal fraud in both jurisdictions is based on the system of
customs and excise taxation on key commodities such as fuel, alcohol, and cigarettes. In the
United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland), section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management
Act 1979 criminalises fraudulent evasion of duty. The penalty for this offence on summary
conviction is a fine which is three times the value of the goods, and/or imprisonment of 6 months.
Upon conviction on indictment, a penalty of any amount and/or 7 years’ imprisonment may be
imposed. The 1979 Act also provides for offences of handling goods subjects to unpaid excise
and taking preparatory steps for evasion of excise duty.67 The Fraud Act 2006 supplements the
1979 Act by prohibiting a range of fraud offences with a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment.
While the custodial sentences in the United Kingdom seem adequate, the regime of fines is not
always effective, as the amount might not be very high if criminals are caught with small quantities
of illegal goods. The United Kingdom should consider setting higher fines.
The legislation pertaining to fiscal/excise fraud in Ireland presents a similar range of prohibition.
Section 102 of the Finance Act 1999, as amended criminalises the improper selling or supplying
of mineral oil, with a fine of €5,000 or 12 months’ imprisonment. These are increased to €126,970
or 5 years, respectively, upon indictment under the Finance Act 2010. Under section 79 of the
Finance Act 2003 as amended, attempting to supply or sell alcohol without paying appropriate
tax or producing or supplying illegally produced alcohol carries (on summary conviction) a fine of
€5,000 or up to 12 months’ imprisonment. On indictment, the penalties are increased to a fine
not exceeding €126,970 or 5 years’ imprisonment. Similar arrangements exist for tobacco fraud
under section 78 of the Finance Act 2005 as amended. While it should be recognised that the
imposition of large fines in Ireland may have a stronger deterrent effect compared to the
United Kingdom, a custodial sentence of 5 years maximum seems rather low. An important
point was raised by the officers of Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs that the amount of illegal
profit made from fiscal/excise fraud is similar to that of drug trafficking, and yet the
punishment regimes are quite different. The research team therefore recommends that this
part of the relevant legislation is reviewed.
In looking at the legislative frameworks on substantive offences in both jurisdictions, it can be
24 |  AHRC Research Project
61 See, for example, the HMRC’s analysis of the new Excise and Customs Movement System <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/emcs/index.htm> accessed 28 February
2014.  
62 European Commission, Functional Excise System Specifications. 
63 [1998] OJ C 24/1.
64 [2010] OJ L 268/1.
65 [2011] OJ L 64/1.
66 COM (2012) 722 final. 
67 ss 170A and 170B.  
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concluded that they are generally in conformity with the international and European standards in
terms of the scope of relevant offences. At the frontline level, the law enforcement community
and members of the legal profession are of the opinion that the current legislative frameworks
are also adequate. However, it was felt that the punishment regimes should be strengthened. A
related question is whether or not the governments in both jurisdictions should strengthen the
legislative provisions to penalise the purchase of some illicit goods. This has long been
established for drug offences. In relation to human trafficking, the United Kingdom has enacted
legislation—the Policing and Crime Act 2009—that imposes a fine of up to £1,000 upon those
who purchase sexual services from trafficked victims, and section 5 of the Criminal Law (Human
Trafficking) Act 2008 in Ireland similarly prohibits the solicitation of trafficked victims for the
purpose of prostitution with a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.68 However, provisions
are lacking in relation to the purchase of illegal cigarettes, fuel, and alcohol, and a question may
be asked whether some types of penalty should be imposed. Retail against Smuggling,
established to tackle cigarette smuggling in Ireland, has suggested an on-the-spot fine before
the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure.69 An argument may be made to apply such
a penalty to illegal fuel or alcohol. However, an important point has also been raised by HMRC
as to whether the implementation of such penalties is an effective use of resources on the part
of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. The extent to which such a measure can
discourage the general public from purchasing illegal goods is also not clear. Therefore, this issue
of penalising the purchase of illicit goods and services deserves further discussion and careful
consideration.
68 The penalties resulting from summary conviction are imprisonment of up to 12 months and/or a fine of up to €5,000. See also ongoing debates on the legal
status of prostitution generally in Department of Justice and Equality, Discussion Document on Future Direction of Prostitution Legislation (June 2012), and Joint
Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality, Report on Hearings and Submissions on the Review of Legislation on Prostitution (June 2013).  
69 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, Correspondence 2012/354 (October 2012).  
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Section 3: 
Investigation and Prosecution
of Organised Crime
3.1 Key Law Enforcement Agencies
The principal section of the PSNI with responsibility for organised crime is the Organised Crime
Branch which has a little over 100 officers. Previously there were various units dealing with
organised crime, such as the drug squad, robbery squad, and economic crime bureau. They were
merged into a single Organised Crime Branch in 2010 after a strategic decision was made that
the PSNI should focus on the activities of organised crime rather than on illicit goods and services.
One key benefit seems to be that officers are structured into omni-competent teams which are
able to tackle the totality of organised crime, rather than having narrower focuses. This in effect
reduces the need for training/retraining depending on the types of crimes they deal with, and
many PSNI officers stated through interviews that the current structure worked well. In recent
times the Organised Crime Branch has engaged in a number of notable initiatives in the battle
against organised crime. In May 2012, it was involved in a major cross-border multi-agency
operation carried out with An Garda Síochána which was codenamed ‘Operation Quest’. The
intended target was organised prostitution, with PSNI officers visiting more than 20 addresses
across every county. This resulted in 5 arrests, the rescue of 3 victims of human trafficking, and
the recovery of significant numbers of documents, phones, and computers as well as cash. In
May 2013, after six months of intensive surveillance, 5 men were arrested for running a purpose-
built underground cannabis farm in County Down. Through this operation, a total of 600 plants
worth over £350,000 were seized. These and other examples of good practice demonstrate a
strong commitment on the part of the PSNI Organised Crime Branch to implement effective law
enforcement.
The PSNI is assisted by two national agencies, underscoring the cross-country nature of
organised crime. The first is HMRC. Two Directorates within the Northern Ireland Department of
HMRC are particularly pertinent to this research. The Criminal Investigation Directorate is tasked
with investigating a range of organised crime offences such as fiscal and excise fraud. This
Directorate is complemented by the Risk and Intelligence Service (Criminal Intelligence Group)
which is responsible for profiling and criminal intelligence work. In September 2013, a joint
operation by HMRC and the PSNI uncovered one of the largest fuel laundering sites, capable of
producing 24 million litres of diesel annually, in Country Down. In March of the same year, HMRC,
Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs, and the Criminal Asset Bureau of An Garda Síochána in Ireland
jointly conducted ‘Operation Loft’ in which 10 raids were conducted across the island of Ireland,
resulting in the recovery of 40,000 litres of illegal fuel. There is no doubt that the experience and
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expertise of HMRC have contributed, and continue to contribute, to the enhancement of law
enforcement against fiscal/excise fraud in Northern Ireland.
The second agency is the NCA which was established by the Crime and Courts Act 2013. It builds
on the work of SOCA and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, and incorporates
some of the functions of the National Policing Improvement Agency. The advent of the NCA has
reopened the political debate on the accountability of national agencies such as the NCA and
HMRC in Northern Ireland. A question here is the extent to which devolution has an impact upon
how they operate and are held accountable in Northern Ireland. The research team interviewed
several SOCA officers before the transition, and they stated that certain political parties continued
to have issues with the organisation due to a lack of sufficient local accountability. One example
of this may be seen from the rejection by the Assembly of a consent motion tabled by the Ulster
Unionist Party in February 2013 for the purpose of legislating for the NCA. Such a political
sentiment has further practical implications. The establishment of the NCA on 7 October 2013
led to the removal of powers previously entrusted to SOCA in Northern Ireland, such as the
powers of a constable. There is also considerable confusion about the potential impact on civil
asset recovery (discussed further below). Despite this, the SOCA officers felt that their position
(and that of the NCA) would be secure for the reason that a UK-wide response is necessary for
organised crime. The NCA also has extensive networks abroad that could be utilised by the law
enforcement community in Northern Ireland where appropriate.
One of the key findings on the work of relevant law enforcement agencies in Northern Ireland is
the strong emphasis placed upon a multi-agency approach. For example, a clear line of
communication/co-ordination is facilitated by CRIMNET (noted above), which allows all of those
concerned to decide which agency is best placed to lead a particular investigation. Regular co-
ordination meetings also take place in order to facilitate effective communication and minimise
duplication of efforts, and all interviewees noted that the working relationship is fairly positive,
with each agency clearly understanding their role without causing unnecessary friction and
competition.
This multi-agency approach is greatly enhanced by the OCTF, which was first established in
Northern Ireland in 2000 and as from 12 April 2010 comes under the auspices of the Department
of Justice. The OCTF brings together the PSNI, HMRC, and other law enforcement agencies, as
well as the local business community. The OCTF is structured into a stakeholder group (chaired
by the Minister of Justice), a strategy group (chaired by the Director of Policing and Community
Safety), and nine sub-groups. These sub-groups deal with major crimes including armed robbery,
cybercrime, intellectual property crime, criminal finance, drugs, immigration and human trafficking,
and fuel fraud, and most of them are chaired by senior law enforcement officers. They meet
several times a year or more where appropriate. The OCTF also produces a range of important
documents including annual reports and threat assessments on organised crime in Northern
Ireland. These reports identify emerging trends in organised crime and provide suggestions for
how these may be tackled. Another important publication is the Northern Ireland Organised Crime
Strategy (NIOCS)70 which sets out the main law enforcement objectives for tackling organised
28 |  AHRC Research Project
70 The Northern Ireland Organised Crime Strategy 2012-14. 
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crime such as making Northern Ireland a hostile environment for organised criminals, informing
the public of crime trends and the work of the OCTF, and supporting communities affected by
organised crime. The effectiveness of these measures is considered below.
When asked about the value of the OCTF, all interviewees stated that it has provided opportunities
to build good working relationships and exchange information. While it is not a decision-making
or operational body, matters discussed are often fed into ongoing practical action against
organised crime. This suggests that the OCTF and sub-groups are not merely talking shops, and
most interviewees concurred on this. To illustrate this with some examples, an in-depth
examination of money service bureaus that have been involved in illegal activities came from
discussions within the criminal finance sub-group. This has enabled those concerned to establish
good working relationships, leading to the identification of widespread fraud that had direct links
to dissident Republicans. Another example of good practice is the creation of an NGO
engagement group for trafficking of human beings. Active participation of the civil society sector
is particularly important for this crime, as they have been instrumental in providing assistance to
victims and raising awareness. Finally, an emerging area where the OCTF threat assessments are
being translated into operations against organised criminality is metal theft. In recent times, the
PSNI has detected trends in the theft of lead from church roofs and schools as well as metal
items from housing developments like radiators, copper pipes, and copper cylinders. When put
together, these incidences suggested a link to organised criminality and have enabled the law
enforcement agencies to put into place strategies to confront the problem.
In Ireland, law enforcement against organised crime is primarily the responsibility of An Garda
Síochána’s National Bureau of Criminal Investigation, which was established as an effective and
active response to the proliferation of serious and organised crime. It was formed in 1997 with
the amalgamation of a number of national investigation units, including the Organised Crime Unit.
It works in conjunction with other departments with responsibility for organised crime including
the Bureau of Fraud Investigation, the National Drugs Unit, the Criminal Assets Bureau, and the
National Immigration Bureau (including the Human Trafficking Investigation and Co-Ordination
Unit). One notable example of law enforcement led by An Garda Síochána is ‘Operation Wireless
III’ conducted in November 2013. Based on proactive intelligence-led law enforcement, it
conducted over 400 searches simultaneously across Ireland, targeting a variety of crimes such
as drugs and firearms offences. Implementation of an operation of this magnitude demonstrates
that various Units within An Garda Síochána work effectively together to promote a concerted
response to organised crime. In order to consolidate resources and efforts and to enhance
efficiency, however, An Garda Síochána might consider establishing a single unit
addressing all forms of organised crime, given the experience of the PSNI Organised Crime
Branch.71
Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs is an independent agency which was established by Government
Order in 1923 and is tasked with collecting taxes and duties and implementing customs controls,
similar to HMRC in the United Kingdom. In recent times, there has been an increased focus on
certain fiscal and safety threats associated with the smuggling of drugs, tobacco, and counterfeit
71 This was also highlighted in the Third Discussion Document, 37.  
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products.72 It investigates and prosecutes appropriate cases of serious tax and duty evasion, and
works with other countries and law enforcement partners in the fight against organised crime.73
‘Operation Loft’, noted above, is one such example. Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs also plays
an important role in tackling drug trafficking, together with the Garda National Drug Unit and other
international agencies, by facilitating controlled delivery and joint investigations. In 2013, it
conducted 6,530 seizures, amounting to 992 kg of illegal drugs. The officers interviewed
confirmed that their working relationship with An Garda Síochána, and its counterpart in Northern
Ireland, is very positive.
Unlike Northern Ireland, Ireland does not have a formal structure akin to the OCTF. This is of
course not to state that it does not appreciate a multi-agency approach. It was discovered that
the opposite is true. For example, section 36 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 requires the police
to set joint policing committees to operate at local authority level and engage with a local senior
police officer on a monthly basis. The aforementioned Operation Wireless III is undoubtedly a
good example of efficient co-ordination within Ireland. Both An Garda Síochána and Revenue,
Irish Tax and Customs have liaison officers attached to each other to facilitate effective
communication and action. Interviewees from these agencies confirmed that the level of co-
operation is very good. When asked if it would be useful to have an arrangement similar to the
OCTF in Ireland, many Garda officers stated that they preferred the current arrangements as they
were adequate for their needs. However, others have recognised certain benefits of a specific
task force. The research team also takes a view that a multi-agency approach is desirable
for organised crime, and that this can be facilitated through effective communication and
co-ordination without sacrificing independence or respective mandates, given the good
example set by Northern Ireland. The establishment of a specific task force on organised
crime can also help the relevant authorities develop a coherent and comprehensive
organised crime strategy, which is currently lacking in Ireland,74 and send a positive
message to the general public as well as criminals that the government takes the issue
seriously. Therefore, the research team recommends that the Irish government consider
establishing a forum where relevant agencies can meet and discuss issues more regularly.
3.2 Special Investigative Techniques to Address Organised Crime
3.2.1 International and Regional Standards
Special investigative techniques are useful and necessary in facilitating intelligence-led law
enforcement. Article 20 of the Organised Crime Convention provides for the appropriate use of
such techniques, including electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations.
Article 20(4) also makes provision for the use of controlled delivery75 with the consent of the State
Parties concerned. Regionally, the Council Framework Decision on Organised Crime noted above
does not contain any provisions relating to the use of special investigative techniques. However,
article 9(4) of the EU Trafficking Directive recognises that such methods should be used:
30 |  AHRC Research Project
72 See Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs, Annual Report 2012. 
73 ibid 46.
74 It is important to recognise here that the Irish government has developed strategies and action plans for particular crimes such as human trafficking, drug
offences, and fiscal/excise fraud. An Garda Síochána also has Annual Policing Plans which reflect the priorities set by the government in tackling organised
crime.  
75 Art 2(i) defines controlled delivery as: ‘the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more states,
with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons
involved in the commission of the offence.’ 
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Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that effective
investigative tools, such as those which are used in organised crime or other
serious crime cases, are available to persons, units or services responsible
for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 2 and 3.
This instrument lacks any definition of the form that these ‘effective investigative tools’ should
take. Some guidance may be gleaned from the Council of Europe Recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers concerning guiding principles on the fight against organised crime.76
Article 19 advises that:
Member States should introduce legislation allowing or extending the use of
investigative measures that enable law enforcement agencies to gain insight,
in the course of criminal investigations, into the activities of the organised
crime groups, including surveillance, interception of communications,
undercover operations, controlled deliveries and the use of informants.
This is expanded by another Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on ‘special
investigation techniques’ in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism.77 Chapter 2(a)(1)
inserts the provision that Member States should, in accordance with the requirements of the
ECHR, define in their national legislation the circumstances in which special investigation
techniques can be used. Chapter 2(a)(3) encourages Member States to take appropriate
legislative measures to ensure adequate control of special investigation techniques by judicial
authorities or other independent bodies. These are essential in maintaining the legality of these
measures and protecting the human rights of suspects as well as the general public.
3.2.2 National Legislation
In Northern Ireland, the key legislation relating to the use of special investigative techniques is
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). RIPA contains provisions for interception
of communications,78 surveillance, and use of CHIS.79 It should be noted from the outset that
these are used to detect crime generally, and therefore the legislation does not create special
powers specifically for organised crime. In relation to interception of communications, a warrant
must generally be issued by the Home Secretary.80 His/her power is to be monitored by the
Interception of Communications Commissioner who holds or must have held a high judicial
office,81 thereby providing some safeguards against the abuse of power. Justice McCloskey of
the High Court added that having a recently retired judge for the Commissioner post would
probably work better in practice, as that would appear more independent and impartial. However,
prior judicial approval is not needed under RIPA. The research team takes a view that such
approval is beneficial as it would ensure compliance with RIPA and the Human Rights Act
1998 before interception is used, strengthen its justification, and avoid complaints being
made at a later stage. This in turn could boost public confidence in law enforcement. Such
76 Rec(2001)11.   
77 Rec(2005)10.  
78 Part 1, ch 1.
79 Part 2, ss 29, 30, and 31 (Northern Ireland) which sets out that authorisations for conduct in Northern Ireland shall be exercisable by the Office of the First
Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland (concurrently with being exercisable by the Secretary of State).
80 ss 6-8.  
81 s 57.  
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an approach has been taken in Australia,82 Canada,83 Germany,84 the Netherlands,85 Poland,86
South Africa,87 Spain,88  Switzerland,89 and the United States of America.90 There is therefore
scope for the United Kingdom to consider this further.
In terms of surveillance, there are three types stipulated under RIPA: directed surveillance,
intrusive surveillance, and CHIS.91 Directed surveillance largely involves surveillance that takes
place in public places and is considered less serious. If surveillance is to take place in private
premises (eg in a dwelling or private vehicle), then it is considered to be intrusive. In both cases
a test of proportionality must be employed before authorisation can be given.92 In relation to
intrusive surveillance, an independent Surveillance Commissioner determines whether or not to
support it.93 Finally, CHIS generally refers to informants or undercover officers.94 In 2010 the UK
Home Office published a Code of Practice for the Use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources in
line with section 71 of RIPA. This document sets out the definitions of such sources and the
procedures for authorising and managing their deployment. All special investigative techniques
stipulated in RIPA can be reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.95 These measures are
in line with article 20 of the Organised Crime Convention, and the law enforcement community in
Northern Ireland generally regards the current legal framework to be sufficient to tackle organised
crime in terms of the powers granted to them. Further, as the legislation applies equally to
terrorism, it is capable of addressing its nexus with organised crime.
Interviews with the PSNI, HMRC and SOCA reveal that these measures are used on a daily basis
to investigate a variety of organised crime. Additionally, controlled delivery is used for crimes
such as drug trafficking. However, surveillance is normally conducted by special surveillance
officers who are part of the HQs, and many PSNI officers within the Organised Crime Branch
stated that they would benefit greatly from having their own surveillance facilities. While there
are resource implications, there is no doubt that such a step would facilitate faster and
more effective responses to organised crime. It is therefore recommended that Northern
Ireland gives this serious consideration.
On the subject of RIPA authorisations, all interviewees stated that respective agencies have
stringent authorisation processes in place. Any request for the use of these measures must be
accompanied by clear justification, and the authorising officers provide rigorous checks to ensure
that requests are in line with RIPA (in terms of necessity and proportionality) and their internal
guidelines. A lack of successful applications under the ‘abuse of process’ doctrine before the
Northern Irish courts is one indication that the law enforcement community has been able to use
special investigative techniques appropriately. A defence lawyer and judges interviewed, as well
as the Interception of Communications Commissioner,96 also concurred on this point. This should
be recognised as an example of good practice.
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82 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, as amended.  
83 Part VI of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
84 Criminal Procedure Code 2009, as amended, s 100b. 
85 Special Powers of Investigation Act 2000.
86 Criminal Procedure Code 1997, as amended, ch 26.
87 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act 2002.  
88 Penal Code, ss 197-199.  
89 Criminal Procedure Code 2007, art 272. 
90 18 USC Chapter 19, §2518 (Procedure for Interception of Wire, Oral or Electronic Communications). It is important to mention, however, that the President of the
United States can, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978, authorise interception in relation to foreign nationals (or persons working on behalf of
foreign governments) for intelligence purposes only.  
91 See Part II. 
92 ss 28 and 32.  
93 s 36.
94 s 26. 
95 RIPA, Part IV.  
96 Interception of Communications Commissioner, Annual Report 2012, 20.   
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RIPA was recently amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Among others, sections
37 and 38 now require judicial approval before the local authorities can obtain communication
data, conduct directed surveillance, or use CHIS. This change came in response to numerous
instances of abuse of these powers by local authorities.97 Another important aspect of this
legislation is that it obliges the Home Secretary to issue a code of practice on the use of CCTV
and appoint a Surveillance Camera Commissioner who monitors implementation of the code. In
accordance with this, the Commissioner was appointed in September 2012, and the Surveillance
Camera Code of Practice was published in June 2013. These represent a step in the right
direction.
It is worth noting that the 2012 Act does not extend to requests made by the law enforcement
agencies. On the one hand, there is a strong argument that the existence of stringent authorisation
processes may not require judicial approval. On the other hand, judicial authorisation to all forms
of special investigative techniques promotes consistency in law enforcement and enhances the
legality of their use. All of these can have a positive impact upon public confidence in law
enforcement against organised crime. Therefore, the research team is of the view that this
should be considered further. In return, the existing internal authorisation procedures might be
relaxed. This could reduce internal frustration/friction, as well as a problem of the authorising
officers reaching varied decisions on the same/similar facts, as expressed by some of the
stakeholders interviewed.
Another point to note is an urgent authorisation procedure. RIPA provides for oral authorisation
in urgent cases to be given for up to 72 hours when it is not possible to obtain a written
authorisation.98 It is to be acknowledged here that the law enforcement agencies sometimes must
act quickly to prevent organised crime and ensure the safety of those concerned, and that good
procedures are in place for this oral authorisation (eg recording of such authorisation). It is also
understandable that authorising officers may not be immediately available to process written
applications. However, a question can simultaneously be raised as to whether these law
enforcement agencies really require 72 hours. A shorter period seems to be a reasonable
option, as that could facilitate closer monitoring and encourage officers to utilise less
intrusive means of investigation as much as possible. By a way of comparison, in Australia99
and Hong Kong,100  the initial period for urgent authorisation is limited to 48 hours; in
Canada, a judge can give oral authorisation for up to 36 hours;101 and law enforcement
agencies in the Republic of Korea must obtain judicial approval within 36 hours.102 The UK
government therefore could examine this further.
In Ireland, the use of surveillance by law enforcement agencies is regulated by the Criminal Justice
(Surveillance) Act 2009. Surveillance under this Act means ‘monitoring, observing, listening to or
making a recording of a particular person or group of persons or their movements, activities and
communications’ or ‘monitoring or making a recording of places or things’. Similar to Northern
Ireland, this Act applies to arrestable offences generally and therefore does not create special
powers for organised crime per se. Interestingly, surveillance is to be approved by a judge, unlike
in Northern Ireland.103 He/she must be satisfied that surveillance is proportionate and that its
97 Home Office, RIPA and Local Authorities: Impact Assessment (2010).
98 ss 34, 36 and 43. 
99 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, s 10, and Surveillance Devices Act 2007, s 33. 
100 Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance, s 22. 
101 Criminal Code of Canada, s 184.3. 
102 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Current Practices in Electronic Surveillance in the Investigation of Serious and Organised Crime (2009), 27.
103 ss 4-5.
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duration is reasonable in achieving its objectives. Before applying to a judge, a superior officer
(eg a rank above superintendent for An Garda Síochána and a rank above principal officer for
Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs) will also have to consider proportionality and necessity.104 This
is a better model than that of Northern Ireland. A High Court Judge in Ireland, who was designated
to review the surveillance powers under this Act, noted that generally the law enforcement
authorities use surveillance appropriately. However, a view was expressed by the ICCL that
judicial oversight could be enhanced through more rigorous scrutiny of relevant agencies
and the publication of detailed annual reports. In addition, urgent authorisation can be
granted for up to 72 hours, similar to the United Kingdom. It is recommended once again
that Ireland reviews this aspect of the 2009 Act. Further, the scope of the 2009 Act is limited
to surveillance with the use of devices, and other measures such as covert following and
observation without surveillance devices are not covered. It is desirable that legislative
provision is made for all forms of surveillance for clarity and consistency. The need for a
clear legal basis has also been stressed by the European Court of Human Rights on
numerous occasions.105
Another relevant legislation in Ireland is the Interception of Postal Packets and
Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act 1993 which allows the relevant agencies to
undertake interceptions for investigation of serious crimes. Unlike surveillance noted above, the
authorisation is given by the Minister of Justice, Equality and Defence. Similar to the United
Kingdom, there is a designated High Court Judge who monitors the operation of
interception.106  However, one human rights NGO has pointed out that the judicial oversight
lacks transparency, and that an annual report does not contain an in-depth examination.107
There is therefore scope for improvement in this regard. Further, an argument may also be
made for prior judicial authorisation. In light of the recent case of DPP v Damache,108 there
seems to an increasing recognition that authorisation for intrusive measures should be given by
an independent person, and a judge can certainly fulfil this role.
In addition, unlike the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, the use of CHIS is not
underpinned by legislation. Rather, this method is regulated by An Garda Síochána’s CHIS
Management Policy. Part 1 sets out the case for the proper management and use of CHIS. Part
2 reflects on the ethical and human rights standards to which An Garda Síochána subscribes.
Finally, Parts 3 and 4 set out the standards for the collection, storage, and use of information
gathered by CHIS as well as the auditing of standards and systems in place. When asked whether
a lack of legislation covering the use of CHIS may pose an issue in terms of legality and
accountability, the responses provided by Garda officers varied. Several officers expressed the
view that the existing Code of Practice for the use of CHIS provided adequate procedures for
oversight and accountability. This document is available to all officers and provides the
professional standards that are required to maintain the confidence of the public and the courts.109
It appears also that judges could ask to see the file from an investigation at any time and have
frequently exercised that right in practice. Further, a retired judge, known as the CHIS Oversight
Authority, monitors the CHIS regime and regularly reports to the Minister of Justice, Equality and
Defence. However, others argued convincingly that legislation should be drafted, as it would
34 |  AHRC Research Project
104 ibid. 
105 See Malone v United Kingdom, App no 8691/79 (1984), Kruslin v France, App no 11801/85 (1990), Taylor-Sabori v United Kingdom, App no 47114/99 (2002),
Rotaru v Romania, App no 28341/95 (2000), and Liberty and Others v United Kingdom, App no 58243/00 (2008).
106 s 8.  
107 Privacy International, Evaluation Report of Ireland’s Privacy and Surveillance Laws (2011), <https://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/ireland> accessed 28
February 2014. 
108 [2012] IESC 11. 
109 Public Statement by the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána on the Management and Use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (date of publication unknown). 
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increase the protection to CHIS and the people that CHIS come into contact with, and would
also protect the Garda officers themselves. This view was also expressed by Justice Butler of
the High Court and the SCC.
It is important to recognise that, similar to Northern Ireland, a good authorisation process
for the use of special investigative techniques seems to be in place in Ireland. However, in
terms of clarity, accountability, and human rights (including the ECHR jurisprudence noted
above), it is desirable to enact comprehensive legislation which covers all aspects of special
investigative techniques with detailed authorising procedures, similar to RIPA in the United
Kingdom. Ireland would then be fully in conformity with the relevant international and
regional standards described above.
3.2.3 Practical Aspects of Investigation
Although the legislative frameworks on substantive criminal law and special investigative
techniques may be regarded as sufficient, the research team discovered a number of issues which
are hampering their effective enforcement. For example, the law enforcement communities in
both jurisdictions highlighted the practical difficulty in identifying criminal groups. There are a
number of criminal groups which may or may not fit into the definitions noted above. Many of
these are quite small in size and are network-based rather than large entities, and their
relationships with each other can change from day to day framed by both co-operation and
competition. This is exacerbated by the increasing presence of foreign criminals in both
jurisdictions. Human trafficking is one example where many traffickers, as well as victims, are
from abroad. One civil society organisation in Northern Ireland noted further that local ethnic
minority groups work with the paramilitaries to commit crimes. Infiltrating these groups is difficult
due to the cultural and language barriers. They also have extensive criminal networks outside of
the island of Ireland, making it more vulnerable to organised crime. In order to overcome some
of these difficulties, Detective Chief Superintendent Roy McComb of the PSNI Organised Crime
Branch recognised the need to put more resources into the use of interpreters, the training of
frontline officers, and the use of CHIS who are foreign nationals. Proactive recruitment of law
enforcement officials from the ethnic minority communities would also be beneficial as they would
be able to create a good rapport and working relationship with these communities. Ireland is
actively recruiting law enforcement officers from ethnic minority communities, and Northern
Ireland should intensify its effort in this regard.
The sophisticated nature of organised crime is also hampering effective law enforcement.
Criminals use advanced technologies and techniques such as the internet to carry out their illegal
activities. Intelligence-led law enforcement is vital and, in addition to the use of special
investigative techniques noted above, it was stressed by the law enforcement communities in
both jurisdictions that the powers stipulated under the proceeds of crime legislation are also
useful. The relevant statutes allow them to closely monitor financial transactions of suspected
offenders and piece together their criminal lifestyle. The statutes also facilitate co-operation from
financial institutions, particularly in relation to reporting suspicious activities. However, it was
highlighted in interviews that the proceeds of crime legislation is regarded as a specialism and
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not well understood by the frontline officers.110 In order to rectify this problem, more officers
should be trained in financial investigation and then retained. At a more strategic level, things
have been changing. One example of good practice can be seen in the practice of the PSNI
Organised Crime Branch after its restructuring in 2010. Previously, financial investigations were
not systematically carried out alongside criminal investigations into organised crime. Since the
restructuring, every team has been assigned a financial investigator. A similar arrangement exists
in Ireland. The Garda Criminal Asset Bureau and the Bureau of Fraud Investigation are said to
work closely with other Units to facilitate parallel financial investigations.
Some issues have also been raised in relation to the special investigative techniques. Many
frontline officers felt that the legislation was sometimes being interpreted too strictly by authorising
officers, making investigations unnecessarily difficult. It was also pointed out that the authorisation
process involved much bureaucracy, wasting valuable resources that could be better spent on
investigations. HMRC officers, however, highlighted the benefits of the authorisation process,
arguing that it encourages professionalism in law enforcement and enhances the legitimacy of
intelligence to be used in criminal investigations and prosecutions. The research team also takes
a view that stringent authorisation is necessary in order to protect the human rights of
suspects and boost public confidence in law enforcement. Alternatively, judicial approval
could mitigate some of these issues as explained above, if the political and law enforcement
communities are willing to consider this option.
In addition, the human rights community in Northern Ireland has raised concerns about a lack of
transparency in procedures, particularly for CHIS. These included a lack of public awareness as
to the extent and nature of criminal conduct that might be committed by CHIS. This indeed is a
difficult issue, as the disclosure of information on covert law enforcement operations can
compromise the effective investigation of organised crime. However, our research revealed that
there are a number of safeguards in place to prevent the abuse of CHIS. The conduct of the PSNI
is scrutinised closely by the Policing Board’s independent human rights adviser. In addition, the
Surveillance Commissioner regularly reviews the existing arrangements in place, and individuals
can lodge complaints before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. These should mitigate some
uncertainty surrounding the use of CHIS in organised crime investigations.
The operation of CHIS has also met some criticisms in Ireland. It was stated by the Garda
Ombudsman Commission in this regard that guidance on CHIS was restricted to high-ranking
officers and there was not sufficient training for all officers.111 The management of documents
relating to registration/recruitment of CHIS was also regarded as inadequate.112 It was
acknowledged that these led to unnecessary risks in the handling and management of CHIS.
Further to this, there is no mechanism to address failure to abide by the guidelines and
procedures, leaving the question of accountability unclear. A report by the Garda Ombudsman in
2008 also highlighted problems with informant handling procedures, training, management, and
governance. As noted above, all of these suggest that legislation setting out clear guidance
and accountability is desirable in Ireland.
36 |  AHRC Research Project
110 See also Third Discussion Document, 35.   
111 The Garda Ombudsman Commission, Special Report to the Minister of Justice and Equality (May 2013), 4 
112 ibid 6.
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A lack of adequate financial, human, and technical resources to combat organised crime was
another common concern expressed by the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions.
By way of example, the PSNI Organised Crime Branch has a budget of approximately £11 million,
which represents less than 1% of the entire PSNI budget. This often forces the Branch to prioritise
important cases with the result that some crimes or criminal groups may not receive sufficient
attention. It is therefore important that both governments allocate adequate resources if
they claim to be serious about tackling organised crime.
One way to alleviate this problem is to use criminal proceeds more effectively. Since 2011, the
full value of assets confiscated from the ‘criminal recovery process’ (ie confiscation after
conviction) is returned to Northern Ireland.113 One half of the pot is used to fund community
projects through the Asset Recovery Community Scheme and the other half is returned to the
law enforcement authorities under the Assets Recovery Incentivisation Scheme (ARIS).114 During
2012 and 2013, the total amount returned to Northern Ireland was £2.1 million, and £1,080,100
was distributed to partner agencies including £110,671 to the PSNI, £11,420 to HMRC, and
£245,263 to the PPS.115 In terms of its usage for law enforcement, the ARIS money funded
financial investigators and intelligence officers,116 and this demonstrates a good use of criminal
proceeds to tackle organised crime. However, a separate arrangement exists under the ‘civil
recovery process’, under which 50% of the criminal proceeds confiscated are returned to
Northern Ireland as part of ARIS, but the other half is retained by the Home Office. The research
team recommends here that the criminal proceeds confiscated through civil recovery also
be returned to Northern Ireland so that relevant agencies can enhance their capacity in law
enforcement.
In contrast, a similar scheme does not exist in Ireland as all criminal assets are sent directly to
the Exchequer. Detective Chief Superintendent Eugene Corcoran reflected that there were
arguments for and against this approach. On the one hand, it is safer and more transparent that
all the money recovered is immediately transferred to the Exchequer. This view was also
expressed by officers of Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs. On the other hand, those funds might
be used more effectively if fed into worthy projects designed to remedy the damage caused by
organised criminals. The funds could also be used to enhance the capacity of the law enforcement
community in Ireland and send a clear message that criminals are not able to benefit from their
activities. The research team therefore recommends that the Irish government consider
instituting a similar initiative.
Another way to alleviate the lack of resources is to make use of external funding.
Intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime provide funding for technical assistance, capacity building, and international
co-operation, and these should be targeted more proactively by the law enforcement
communities in both jurisdictions. Employment of people dedicated to income generation is
also beneficial. The PSNI already has such personnel, and this is an example of good practice.
113 OCTF Annual Report 2013, 48.
114 ibid.
115 ibid 50.
116 ibid 51.  
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Further, there is scope to improve the relationship with the local businesses which become part
of organised crime. It has been highlighted through interviews in both jurisdictions that obtaining
co-operation in money laundering investigations from financial institutions, including accountants
and money service bureaus, is still difficult, although significant progress has been made. The
reasons for this include a lack of sufficient training, expertise, and experience to detect and report
financial crimes, the culture of fear which prevents them from reporting suspicious activities, and
active collusion with criminals. Other industries such as agriculture, construction, catering, and
shellfish are also known to exploit trafficked victims, and there is an acute need to educate and
prevent them from engaging in slavery and forced labour. All of these require the concerned
authorities to facilitate more targeted community outreach initiatives, training, and
awareness raising.
In addition to these practical matters, there are several key human rights issues which should be
highlighted in relation to criminal investigations. It is important to acknowledge from the outset
that all agencies interviewed regard the protection and promotion of human rights to be an integral
part of their work. In Northern Ireland, the PSNI has in-house human rights training which all
officers must undergo upon recruitment. The training itself consists of workshops and online
modules which individual officers can take at their own pace. There is also a specific human rights
legal adviser who can be contacted by officers to seek clarification on human rights issues in law
enforcement. An independent human rights adviser within the Policing Board also closely
scrutinises the compliance of the PSNI. These are examples of good practice, and clearly
demonstrate that the law enforcement community in Northern Ireland takes human rights
seriously. One point to note, however, is that there is no compulsory human rights training for
new officers after the initial training. The onus is left to each individual officer to undergo additional
training, although regular updates on new/emerging human rights issues as well as national and
European case law seem to be circulated widely. The extent to which they serve as “training”
is not clear, and it is recommended that more formal human rights training be provided on
a regular basis. The same goes for other agencies. Also, human rights training is not
generally conducted by external human rights organisations, and there is scope to make
use of their expertise more proactively in the future. This could also enhance mutual trust
with the civil society sector and boost public confidence in law enforcement.
In Ireland, Garda officers reported that they are aware of human rights considerations in their
day-to-day work but rarely used traditional human rights language such as articles 2 (Right to
Life), 6 (Right to a Fair Trial), and 8 (Right to Private and Family Life) of the ECHR. This is mainly
because of the Irish Constitution, which seems to contain as many safeguards. However, there
is no doubt that the constitutional protection is complemented by the European Convention on
Human Rights Act 2003, which is similar to the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom.
In terms of training, there is a human rights element in most police training, the majority of which
is provided at the time of recruitment, like in Northern Ireland. Such training is also conducted
when officers are promoted to a higher rank. While this may be an example of good practice, it
simultaneously suggests that lower-ranking officers may only have basic human rights training.
In addition, unlike the PSNI, An Garda Síochána does not have an in-house human rights adviser.
38 |  AHRC Research Project
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Although Garda officers can contact a department in Garda Headquarters that advises on
such issues or simply contact a senior officer, the appointment of a dedicated human rights
legal adviser would be beneficial particularly as Ireland lacks clear legislation on certain
areas such as the use of special investigative techniques, as noted above. Once again, this
could generate a positive impact on public confidence in law enforcement.
The principal human rights considerations encountered by law enforcement officers from both
jurisdictions during investigation include articles 2, 6, and 8 of the ECHR. Article 2 is relevant
particularly in relation to the protection of witnesses, CHIS, and victims. In relation to human
trafficking, for example, several interviewees in both jurisdictions confirmed that protection of
trafficked victims takes precedence even when this could affect their investigations. The same
applies to the protection of witnesses and jurors from intimidation and violence and, in this sense,
tackling the culture of fear may be regarded as an important part of article 2 obligations. Also, a
SOCA officer highlighted a need to ensure that information used during the proceedings cannot
be traced back to the source, and this means that effective witness protection is essential.
The right to privacy is another right which can be affected, particularly by the use of special
investigative techniques. Under the ECHR, this right is qualified, in that it can be curtailed in the
interests of national security, public safety, and prevention of crime.117 However, as set out in
Kennedy v United Kingdom (2010)118 and other jurisprudence noted elsewhere, the use of these
measures must meet three conditions: 1) existence of legal basis (in accordance with the law), 2)
legitimate aim, and 3) proportionality (necessary in a democratic society). In the present case,
the European Court of Human Rights continued to hold that RIPA had sufficient safeguards to
protect the human rights of those affected in relation to the interception of communications
(including the decision of the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner) and
did not violate the ECHR. The Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 in Ireland conforms to
these principles to an extent, although there is much scope for improvement in relation to other
measures not stipulated.
In addition, the treatment of suspects during investigations entails human rights implications. In
Ireland, a period of pre-trial detention can be quite long. For drug trafficking, an initial maximum
period of 48 hours may be extended by a further 120 hours upon application to a Circuit Court
judge or a District Court judge.119 It was argued by a defence lawyer that an extension for this
initial period is routine in Ireland. While judicial intervention adds a certain degree of safeguards,
some doubts were expressed by the human rights community and defence lawyers in Ireland as
to the necessity of such a long period.120 Pre-charge detention in the United Kingdom also raises
concern, particularly when organised crime has a nexus with terrorism. While the previous period
of 28 days was reduced to 14 days with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the human rights
community has argued that the period is still long compared to other jurisdictions. This is one
area of law enforcement where extra powers in relation to terrorism can be used for organised
crime.
117 Art 8(2).  
118 App no 26839/05. 
119 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996, s 2. Criminal Justice Act 2007, s 50 also allows detention of up to 7 days in relation to firearm offences.   
120 See also: Third Discussion Document, 37, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Ireland’s Second Periodic Report, A/55/40 (2000) para 17,
and Irish Human Rights Commission, Submission to the Human Rights Committee on the Examination of Ireland’s Third Periodic Report (March 2008), 22.  
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Another issue raised by interviewees in Ireland is access to a lawyer. In the United Kingdom, a
suspect has a right to consult a duty solicitor at the police station upon arrest. In contrast, access
to a lawyer is limited in Ireland. While the Irish Constitution provides that an accused is entitled
to ‘reasonable access’, it does not provide clear guidance. In fact, lawyers are not entitled to be
present during a police interview in Ireland, and concerns have been expressed by defence
lawyers and the human rights community. The Department of Justice and Equality recently
commissioned a Working Group to Advise on a System Providing for the Presence of a Legal
Representative During Garda Interviews. This was in response to the proposed EU Directive on
the Right of Access to Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings,121 which was eventually adopted in
October 2013. When reporting their findings in July 2013, the Working Group acknowledged that
the current policy of preventing a solicitor from being present at a Garda interview would come
under increased pressure from the ECHR even if Ireland decided not to opt into the EU
Directive.122 Given the complex nature of organised crime and a possibility of heavier
penalties, as well as the additional powers given to the law enforcement authorities, the
presence of a lawyer during interviews is a reasonable step to be taken to respect and
protect the right of suspects. It is also recommended that Ireland opts into the EU Directive.
Finally, the impact of devolution of criminal justice and policing should be mentioned. Most
interviewees in the island of Ireland stated that devolution has made little difference in terms of
day-to-day law enforcement activities against organised crime. However, some stated that
devolution is making things easier to an extent. For example, direct communication with the
Justice Minister and the Department of Justice can now be facilitated, whereas in the past
decisions were made in London, taking a longer time to facilitate action. It was also noted that
the Department of Justice/Justice Minister have been very supportive of the work of the PSNI
Organised Crime Branch. In addition, the law enforcement community has had more contact with
the politicians in the Assembly in recent times. The relevant agencies often provide briefing to
MLAs, and it seems that there is a strong interest within the Assembly on organised crime and
law enforcement.
In summary, the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions have played, and continue to
play, an important role in investigating organised crime. Their efforts and numerous examples of
good practice should be clearly and widely recognised. However, it is also evident that there are
issues which are hampering effective law enforcement against organised crime. In the main, more
resources should be allocated to tackling organised crime so that the concerned agencies are
trained and equipped adequately for them to be able to detect and investigate organised crime.
For this to happen, the wider support of the political communities as well as the general public
in both jurisdictions is essential.
40 |  AHRC Research Project
121 [2013] OJ L 294/1.
122 Report of the Working Group, 22. See also Mader v Croatia (2011), App no 56185/07 and Sebalj v Croatia (2011), App no 4429/09. 
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3.3 Prosecution
The PPS in Northern Ireland was established by the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 and
formally came into being in 2005 as the successor to the Department of the Director of Public
Prosecutions. The PPS has been described as one of the key strands of the Good Friday
Agreement and the Criminal Justice Review in that it was formed to provide a prosecution service
free from any power of superintendence.123 The PPS is divided into four regions, each headed by
a Regional Prosecutor (Assistant Director) who has overall responsibility for decisions as to
prosecution, with the exception of those cases which are considered by prosecutors in the
Headquarters.124 In general, organised crime offences come under the auspices of the Central
Casework Unit, which deals with cases of a serious or sensitive nature (eg terrorism offences or
cases that involve the use of an informant or surveillance techniques). There are also a number
of other sections within the PPS, each headed by an Assistant Director. These include Fraud and
Departmental Prosecutions, Policy and Information, and High Court and International Matters.125 
In England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) utilises so-called ‘Legal Guidance’
which describe up-to-date legal issues and charging standards in detail. Many of these are
relevant to organised crime as they provide guidance relating to drug offences, fraud, human
trafficking and smuggling, and money laundering.126 These are important not only for prosecution
of organised crime, but also for facilitation of consistency in decision making which can help
boost public confidence in law enforcement.
In contrast, the PPS in Northern Ireland does not produce Legal Guidance regularly. It recently
adopted a policy on human trafficking127 due to a growing interest in this crime, but there are no
guidelines for other forms of organised crime. This may be understandable, as various statutes
relating to organised crime apply to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland simultaneously, and
therefore the PPS takes account of the existing CPS guidance. Indeed, the PPS prosecutors
stated that they refer to the guidance where appropriate, although they are not bound by them.
However, the devolution of criminal justice and policing in Northern Ireland may require the PPS
to create its own guidance in the future. When asked about this, prosecutors stated that the ‘Code
for Prosecutors’, which is applicable to all crime, provides detailed guidance on, inter alia,
evidential/public interest tests, disclosure, and unduly lenient sentences.128 It is worth noting here
that public interest considerations include offences carried out in pursuit of organised crime.129
In addition, the PPS does produce internal guidance for prosecutors on law and practice that are
relevant to organised crime, including the one on Ancillary Orders (eg Financial Reporting Orders
and Forfeiture) and on appropriate venues for drug-related offences. ‘Legislation Notes’ are also
pertinent as they ensure that the PPS prosecutors are kept up to date with relevant legislation
and any subsequent changes. However, given its complex nature, the PPS could benefit from
having specific guidelines/policies on organised crime to facilitate consistency in decision
making. In particular, there is a need for clearer guidelines on fuel/tobacco smuggling which
are regarded as very serious in this jurisdiction, as well as civil recovery as the NCA is not
currently able to exercise this function sufficiently, as will be shown below.
123 PPS, Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2012/13.
124 ibid.
125 ibid 13. 
126 CPS, Legal Guidance <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/> accessed 28 February 2014.
127 Public Prosecution Service Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Human Trafficking.
128 Code for Prosecutors (revised 2008).  
129 ibid 12.  
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Under the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, the PPS can provide prosecutorial advice to the
PSNI where crimes are particularly serious. The PSNI can also approach the PPS at any stage of
the investigation. One key difference between the PPS and the CPS in England and Wales seems
to be that a CPS prosecutor is assigned to each case from the very beginning of the investigation
whereas this is not normally the case in Northern Ireland. However in some complex cases and
in others that are dealt with by the Central Casework Section, the PPS prosecutors are often
assigned at an early stage of police investigation to provide prosecutorial advice and assistance.
While it is to be appreciated that this has some resource implications for a small jurisdiction
like Northern Ireland, the CPS model could be adopted specifically for all cases involving
organised crime to facilitate more regular communications and exchanges of
evidence/intelligence.
One further point in relation to prosecution is immunity granted to assisting offenders. Sections
71-74 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 allow the PPS to enter agreements
with offenders to provide assistance in criminal investigations, including giving evidence. In return,
the PPS may agree to provide immunity from prosecution, undertaking as to the use of evidence
(that it will not be used against the assisting offenders), or undertaking to provide an account of
assistance rendered to the court in support of a reduced sentence. These measures are in line
with article 26 of the UN Organised Crime Convention, as well as article 4 of the EU Framework
Decision on Organised Crime which oblige States to encourage offenders to co-operate, and the
PPS prosecutors acknowledge that this has a potential to dismantle criminal groups and catch
crime bosses who are particularly difficult to prosecute due to lack of evidence. If these provisions
are used effectively, then prohibition of membership of criminal organisations perhaps is not really
needed.
The CPS has published guidelines for prosecutors who wish to use immunity, undertakings, and
agreements under the 2005 Act.130 Part A sets out the general principles, including the provision
that accomplices should be prosecuted whether or not they agree to be called as a witness. For
that reason, full immunity from prosecution should be offered only in the most exceptional cases.
The potential for providing immunity or sentence reduction should be assessed against strict
criteria including the public interest test. The PPS noted that the relevant provisions in the 2005
Act were more transparent compared to in the past. However, some concerns were also
expressed as to the credibility/authenticity of information provided by such offenders. Protection
of those assisting offenders also poses some challenges.
One of the key issues raised by stakeholders, particularly at the prosecution stage, is the
intimidation of victims, witnesses, and informants that prevents them from providing evidence.
Unfortunately, it seems that prosecution of obstruction of justice is quite rare, suggesting that
criminals are able to keep one step ahead of the law enforcement agencies. Also, intimidation
and harming of witnesses under sections 39 and 40 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
only attracts 5 years’ imprisonment. In order to send a clear message that such conduct is
not acceptable, it is recommended that the punishment regime be strengthened. In addition,
community policing is regarded as extremely important in Northern Ireland, and the relevant
42 |  AHRC Research Project
130 CPS, Queen's Evidence - Immunities, Undertakings and Agreements under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/queen_s_evidence_-
_immunities_undertakings_and_agreements_under_the_serious_organised_crime_and_police_act_2005/> accessed 28 February 2014. 
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agencies should continue their efforts in this regard. This will eventually help boost mutual
trust and public confidence in law enforcement.
A final point worth mentioning is the possibility of having a dedicated unit on organised crime or
a prosecutor dealing with organised crime. Such arrangements were made in England and Wales
with the establishment of the Organised Crime Division within the CPS in 2005.131 Detective Chief
Superintendent Roy McComb argued that such a dedicated unit would be extremely beneficial,
as the nature of organised crime requires those that prosecute it to be specialists in the field.
While prosecutors agreed that having expertise in difficult areas is very important, they felt that it
might not be necessary to designate somebody for one specific area, as they already achieve
that to some extent by having a centralised team with a small number of prosecutors.
In Ireland, the Office of the DPP was established in 1974, and all indictable offences are
prosecuted by the DPP in accordance with the Constitution. Like the PPS in Northern Ireland,
the DPP in this jurisdiction is also an independent agency. This office has three divisions. First,
there is a directing division which makes decisions on serious cases (22 prosecutors). Within this,
there are sub-divisions, some of which deal specifically with organised crime such as human
trafficking and corruption. Then there is a solicitors’ division which implements the direction to
prosecute and deals with court work. Finally, there is an administrative division. In addition, there
are 32 State Solicitors operating outside Dublin who are private solicitors on contract. Unlike the
PPS in Northern Ireland, where prosecutors are involved and make a decision in every case,
prosecutors in Ireland have delegated some of these tasks to An Garda Síochána with the result
that they make decisions in most summary or lesser offences. In relation to serious cases of
organised crime, An Garda Síochána cannot charge without referring them to the Office of the
DPP. This is in line with section 8 of the Garda Síochána Act 2006. The Office of the DPP has a
system in place to ensure that An Garda Síochána receive direction as quickly as possible.
Prosecutors are placed on a mobile phone roster a week at a time so that Garda officers can
receive direction outside of hours if necessary. An Garda Síochána will also contact prosecutors
regularly for their views and/or advice or to discuss a strategy in advance of taking any actions.
Also, unlike the CPS/PPS, the Office of the DPP does not have prosecution guidance/guidelines
on organised crime, and given that organised crime cases are not as widespread as in the United
Kingdom, there does not appear to be an acute need to create one. When asked whether
prosecutors should have their own guidelines, one prosecutor answered that this would facilitate
consistency in decision making. Some prosecutors felt this was not necessary as the relatively
small size of the directing division (22 persons) ensures that there is good interaction between
prosecutors, which, in turn, promotes uniformity in decision making. While respecting the
current arrangements in place, the research team wishes to reiterate the benefits of having
clearer guidance on organised crime, and therefore recommends that Ireland considers
developing them.
In Ireland, immunity from prosecution might be offered by the DPP in order to elicit useful evidence
and co-operation in prosecuting and punishing organised crime. Aside from the area of cartel
 
131 See CPS, Organised Crime Division <http://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/ocd.html> accessed 28 February 2014. 
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immunity under the Competition Act 2002, there is no statute providing detailed guidance on
immunity and other measures like the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 in the United
Kingdom, although there is an internal guideline on the matter. On this issue, the Deputy Director
of Public Prosecutions stated that the current system works well and therefore that there is no
pressing need to legislate. Another prosecutor noted that the granting of immunity and other
measures is used sparingly in practice because evidence emanating from such source is treated
with much more caution by a judge or jury. This was also confirmed by a defence lawyer.
However, similar to the use of special investigative techniques, a lack of legislation raises
issues in terms of transparency and legality. The research team therefore recommends that
Ireland considers legislating on this issue.
Obstruction of justice was also highlighted as a problem in Ireland, and it seems that the culture
of fear is evident in this jurisdiction as well. Compared to the United Kingdom, this offence attracts
15 years’ imprisonment under section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999, as amended by the
Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009. This is an example of good practice as Ireland clearly
recognises the significance of punishing this offence. Ireland also has an excellent tradition
of facilitating community policing much like Northern Ireland, and the relevant agencies
should continue their efforts in order to reduce this culture of fear.
3.4 Cross-Border Co-operation
3.4.1 International/Regional Standards
Internationally, there are a few instruments which facilitate international co-operation. The
Organised Crime Convention is one example. Article 16 obliges States to facilitate extradition,
and article 17 touches upon transfer of prisoners. In addition, article 18 sets out a range of
measures connected to ‘Mutual Legal Assistance’ including the sharing of judicial documents,
executing searches, and seizing and freezing assets, whereas article 19 obliges States to consider
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements on joint investigations. In addition to the Organised
Crime Convention, the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances 1988 also contains provisions related to mutual legal assistance,132 transfer of
proceedings,133 and other forms of co-operation and training.134 
Regionally, police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters has experienced a gradual
evolution under the Treaty on European Union which was later revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam
in 2000. When the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the EU became a single entity, and its
functions are now stipulated under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This
treaty contains provisions relating to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under Title V, and
the key principles relevant to the fight against organised crime are an approximation of national
criminal laws and procedures, mutual recognition of judicial decisions, and the principle of
availability (intelligence exchange).
44 |  AHRC Research Project
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These principles have been facilitated through a variety of legal instruments and other measures.
One example is the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement 1985 and the Schengen
Convention 1990 into the EU legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Schengen Acquis).135
It contains enhanced provisions for police co-operation including cross-border surveillance, hot
pursuit, and the establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS). Both the United
Kingdom and Ireland were not initially part of the Schengen Convention. The United Kingdom
subsequently decided to opt into some arrangements relating to police and judicial co-operation
in criminal matters in 2000,136 and Ireland followed suit in 2002.137 In relation to customs co-
operation, the Naples II Convention is important. Similar to the Schengen Acquis, it encourages
Member States to facilitate ‘special forms of co-operation’, including hot pursuit, cross-border
surveillance, controlled delivery and joint investigation teams.138 Both the United Kingdom and
Ireland ratified this instrument. Under the transitional arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty, they
have a right to opt into measures under Title V.
Another important measure worth mentioning is the European Arrest Warrants (EAWs)139 regime
that has made significant changes in the way extradition is carried out by EU Member States.
Under article 2 of the EAW Framework Decision, the requirement for double criminality has been
removed for a wide range of organised crime. A minimum threshold has also been applied so
that a warrant can only be issued when an offence is punishable by imprisonment for 1 year or
more or, in the case of the offences set out in article 2(2) (where proof of correspondence is not
required), 3 years. In addition, a prescribed time limit of 10 days has been imposed for the
execution of a request where the requested person has consented to surrender. When a requested
person refuses to consent to his or her surrender, the executing judicial authority should make a
final decision within 90 days.140
There are other instruments designed to encourage cross-border co-operation. article 13 of the
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000141 encourages the EU Member
States to set up joint investigation teams (JITs) with a view to improving police co-operation. Such
teams can consist of judicial and police authorities from at least two Member States and carry
out criminal investigations into specific matters for a limited period.142  Other relevant instruments
include the Council Framework Decisions on the Application of the Principle of Mutual
Recognition to Financial Penalties,143 and to Confiscation Orders,144 the Council Framework
Decision on Simplifying the Exchange of Information and Intelligence between Law Enforcement
Authorities of the Member States of the European Union,145 and the Council Decision on the
Stepping Up of Cross-Border Co-operation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism and Cross-
Border-Crime.146 Finally, outside of the EU legal order, the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959147 is also relevant.
135 Protocol No 19.
136 Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the
provisions of the Schengen acquis [2000] OJ L 131/43.
137 Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis [2002] OJ L
64/20.  
138 Title IV.
139 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedure between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1.
140 Art 23.
141 [2000] OJ L 197/1. 
142 para 1. 
143 [2005] OJ L 76/16. 
144 [2006] OJ L 328/59.
145 [2006] OJ L386/89. 
146 [2008] OJ L210/1. See also Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border-crime with respect to its application [2008] OJ L210/12. 
147 ETS No 30.
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3.4.2 National Legislation
In the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, the Extradition Act 2003 incorporates the
regime of EAWs. In return for streamlining extradition within EU Member States, the legislation
contains several safeguards to protect the rights of suspects/defendants. For example, it provides
for a number of grounds for refusal, including double jeopardy, extraneous consideration (where
there is the likelihood of persecution or no guarantee of a fair trial), passage of time, age, and the
rule of speciality.148 Another notable aspect of the Extradition Act 2003 is the inclusion of human
rights considerations as an additional ground for refusal. Section 21 provides that a judge must
decide whether extradition would be compatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under
the ECHR, and this goes further than what is set out in the EAW Framework Decision. According
to the Recorder of Belfast, issues are occasionally raised relating to article 3 (where defendants
could face inhuman treatment back home)149 or article 8 (where they have strong family ties in
Northern Ireland). In practice, most of these cases are generally unsuccessful as they lack merit
in practice. This seems to be in line with the ECHR jurisprudence that it is only in exceptional
cases where protection of human rights would outweigh the legitimate aim of preventing serious
crime including organised crime.150 In any event, judges in Northern Ireland agree that these
safeguards are rigorously examined and applied where appropriate.
The use of EAWs attracted widespread support from officers in the PSNI, PPS, and SOCA. They
are issued and received quite frequently in Northern Ireland. Generally the vast majority of EAWs
come in from Eastern Europe, including Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. Ireland was described
as the next highest user. The PSNI receives a higher number of EAWs than they would issue, and
in numerical terms, there could be at any one time about 40 to 50 that they are working on. The
Northern Ireland branch of SOCA relied upon the EAWs much less, perhaps only once or twice
a year. A relative lack of reliance on EAWs by SOCA was also confirmed by the Recorder of Belfast
and by Judge Miller of the County Court. All of these seem to indicate that extradition relating to
organised crime is not as frequent as in the rest of Great Britain, and that criminals are prosecuted
and punished in appropriate jurisdictions in most cases.
A common opinion expressed by the PPS, PSNI, and SOCA was that the scrapping of EAWs
would be problematic if there was no suitable alternative. Justice McCloskey also agrees that
the EAW is a very important instrument which facilitates good cross-border co-operation. The
key principle behind the implementation of EAWs is mutual recognition of judicial decisions noted
above, and the judges in both jurisdictions stated that mutual recognition has been facilitated
smoothly between the two jurisdictions, thanks partly to the historical foundation and cultural
similarity, and partly to the fact that both the United Kingdom and Ireland have a shared common
law tradition. This is an example of good practice where the EU principle is successfully
implemented at the national level. However, defence lawyers interviewed made an important point
that mutual recognition and trust are still difficult to achieve with civil law jurisdictions in
continental Europe as the criminal procedures are different.
Another important piece of legislation is the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975. Under the Act, a range
of offences committed within Ireland can be tried in Northern Ireland. Reciprocal arrangements
46 |  AHRC Research Project
148 ss 12-17.  
149 See, for example, Lithuania v Campbell [2013] NIQB 19, where extradition was refused by the Northern Ireland Court as the defendant would likely be held in
conditions in breach of art 3 of the ECHR.  
150 King v United Kingdom, App no 9742/07 (2010). 
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are contained in the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act 1976 in Ireland.151 These include murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping or false imprisonment, and some criminal damage offences and
offences against the person. Schedule 1 of the 1975 Act also includes hijacking, explosive
substances offences, and firearms offences. The main thrust behind these statutes was the need
to address terrorism more effectively. However, in a session of the Parliamentary Northern Ireland
Affairs Committee dedicated to cross-border co-operation, the PSNI raised an important question
of whether the list of offences should be updated beyond terrorism-related crimes. In particular,
Deputy Chief Constable Gillespie suggested that organised crime such as human trafficking, e-
crime, money laundering, and fraud should be included.152 The law enforcement officials, judges,
and criminal lawyers interviewed in both jurisdictions also responded that the time is right to
update respective legislation, and the research team regards this as a reasonable step
forward. However, a reservation was expressed by the ICCL in light of the discrepancies
relating to the treatment of defendants as highlighted above. This is an important point, and
if this legislative change is to happen, both governments should ensure fair treatment of
defendants.
There are a few more relevant statutes to be mentioned. The Criminal Justice (International Co-
operation) Act 1990 enables the United Kingdom to co-operate with other States in criminal
proceedings and investigations. The Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 is also pertinent.
It touches upon mutual provision of evidence between the UK and other governments, execution
of asset freezing orders, and transfer of prisoners. Another important aspect is that, together with
the Police Reform Act 2002, the 2003 Act has incorporated the EU Framework Decision on JITs.
Finally, the aforementioned Naples II Convention has been implemented through the existing
legislative provisions, namely the European Communities Act 1972 and section 9 of the Customs
and Excise Management Act 1979.
In relation to prosecution of cross-border offences, the CPS has published guidance on how to
deal with jurisdictional conflicts.153 The document draws upon the Eurojust Guidelines on the
matter,154 which sets out the preliminary presumption that, if possible, a prosecution should take
place in the jurisdiction where the majority of the criminality occurred. This is based upon the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction, which is a fundamental principle under international law. Other
factors that may arise include the location of the accused and extradition and surrender
procedures as well as the interests of victims and witnesses. It cautions, however, that the relative
sentencing powers of courts must not be a primary factor in deciding in which jurisdiction a case
should be prosecuted. By way of illustration, in the case of Matyas Pis,155 the defendant trafficked
two women from Hungary via Dublin airport to Belfast for the purpose of sexual exploitation. It
was evident that the substantive offences of sexual exploitation and trafficking occurred in
Northern Ireland, and therefore a decision was taken to prosecute him in this jurisdiction. It was
confirmed by prosecutors in both jurisdictions that generally no problem arises in making this
type of decision as they are able to communicate with each other closely and effectively to avoid
jurisdictional conflicts.
151 s 14. 
152 Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Second Report, Cross-Border Co-operation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
(2009).
153 CPS, Jurisdiction <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/jurisdiction/#an12> accessed 28 February 2014.  
154 Eurojust Guidelines: Making the Decision - Which Jurisdiction Should Prosecute? <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/jurisdiction/#an12>  accessed 28
February 2014. 
155 [2012] NICC 14.
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Ireland also seems to have a good legislative framework to facilitate international co-operation.
The European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 is one example. Incoming requests are passed to the
Department of Justice and Equality Central Authority) and then to the Office of Chief State
Solicitor, which seeks the endorsement of the High Court. Outgoing requests are forwarded by
the Office of the DPP to the Department of Justice and Equality, which in turn transmits them to
the requested States.156 Similar to the Extradition Act 2003 of the United Kingdom, the Irish
legislation also contains a number of safeguards, including compatibility with the ECHR.
The Irish government recently published its Annual Report for 2012 on the operation of the
European Arrest Warrant Act 2003. According to this, Ireland received 313 EAWs from Member
States, with 51 of these coming from the United Kingdom, including 11 from Northern Ireland.157
The principal offences cited were: murder/grievous bodily harm (22), sexual offences including
rape and sexual abuse of children (13), drugs offences (34), organised crime/robbery (116), fraud
(77), and human trafficking (1).158 Ireland also issued 88 EAWs to other Member States in 2012
with the majority of these (55) being transmitted to the United Kingdom.159 Officers from An Garda
Síochána, prosecutors, and a High Court Judge confirmed that EAWs are an effective resource
and are normally carried out relatively quickly.
In terms of other cross-border co-operation, several other statutes are worth mentioning. First,
the Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004 incorporates the aforementioned EU
Framework Decision on JITs. A decision to co-operate is made by the Garda Commissioner. In
addition, the Irish government has enacted another piece of legislation, the Criminal Justice
(Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, which conforms to the Council Decision on the Stepping Up of
Cross-Border Co-operation noted above. It includes provisions on taking evidence in connection
with criminal investigations or proceedings in another country,160 search for and seizure of material
on behalf of another country,161 and confiscation and forfeiture orders made in another country.162
Further, in relation to customs co-operation, the Customs and Excise (Mutual Assistance) Act
2001 provides a legal basis to implement the Naples II Convention, whereas the Criminal Justice
(Mutual Assistance) 2008 facilitates other law enforcement co-operation. In summary, both
jurisdictions seem to have sufficient legislative frameworks to facilitate cross-border co-operation,
and they are generally in line with the relevant international and European standards.
3.4.3 Practical Aspects of Cross-Border Co-operation
From a practical point of view, all interviewees in both jurisdictions said that the state of affairs in
relation to cross-border co-operation is generally positive. In Northern Ireland, a formal request
for evidential matters is made through International Letters of Request (ILORs) issued by the PPS
or judiciary163 that are communicated to the Department of Justice and Equality in Dublin. If a
request relates to coercive measures such as the execution of a search warrant, that would go
to the Home Office in the first instance, and then would be relayed to its counterpart in Ireland.164
In relation to requests from Ireland, they are made through the DPP and/or the Department of
Justice and Equality, and are communicated to their counterparts in the United Kingdom. It
understandably takes a long time to draft ILORs, and some frustrations were expressed by the
48 |  AHRC Research Project
156 Department of Justice and Equality, The European Arrest Warrant, a Guide to Irish Procedures (January 2006), 7-10.
157 ibid 15.
158 ibid 8.
159 ibid 20.
160 ss 62-75.
161 ss 31-48.
162 ss 49-57.
163 2003 Act, s 7.  
164 See, for example, POCA, s 72.
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law enforcement officers during interviews as this often results in delays in criminal investigations.
Therefore careful consideration seems to be given beforehand in deciding exactly what the law
enforcement officers wish to achieve. Another example of formal co-operation is the adoption of
the ‘Inter-Governmental Agreement on Police Co-operation’165 which provides for a range of
functions designed to improve cross-border law enforcement in the island of Ireland. These
include the facility for police officers from Northern Ireland to apply for posts in An Garda Síochána
and vice versa. It also provides for the organisation of an annual cross-border conference, training
on cross-border policing, appointment of expert groups to review the existing arrangements, and
facilitation of joint investigations.
While respecting these and other formal arrangements for co-operation, it was discovered through
interviews that a more informal approach to cross-border co-operation is facilitated regularly.
Frontline officers and prosecutors have their own contacts and can simply pick up a phone to
ask question and exchange information. They also have regular face-to-face meetings as
everything cannot be done through emails and phone calls. The key to successful cross-border
co-operation is the ability to build a good personal/working relationship, and it is important to
highlight here that the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions have been able to do
that. There are examples of good practice to illustrate this. In 2011, An Garda Síochána and the
PSNI conducted a joint drug trafficking operation that targeted one particular criminal group,
resulting in the seizure of 337 kg of cannabis resin worth over £1.58 million (€2 million) as well as
the arrests of 5 gang members.166 More recently in 2013, HMRC and Revenue, Irish Tax and
Customs jointly co-ordinated ‘Operation Loft’ as noted above. These and other examples
demonstrate that the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions work well together, and
this was also acknowledged by the UK Parliamentary Northern Ireland Affairs Committee back in
2009.
There are other ways to facilitate cross-border co-operation. For example, the OCTF sub-groups
on human trafficking and fuel enforcement include representatives from Ireland. This ensures
direct communication and facilitation of good working relationships. Staff exchanges also take
place regularly within the law enforcement communities between both jurisdictions. Interestingly,
such exchanges are governed by legislation in Ireland, namely the Garda Síochána (Police Co-
Operation) Act 2003. However, such exchange does not seem to be common for Revenue,
Irish Tax and Customs, and its desirability was expressed by some officers. In addition, there
is an annual cross-border conference where the law enforcement communities meet and discuss
issues of mutual interest, although it could be asked whether one conference per year is sufficient.
Finally, both An Garda Síochána and the PSNI now publish a joint Cross-Border Organised Crime
Assessment. These are once again examples of good practice, and it seems clear that some
measures stipulated under the aforementioned Inter-Governmental Agreement are being
implemented by both jurisdictions.
Moreover, An Garda Síochána and the PSNI have published a joint Cross-Border Policing Strategy
in 2010 which builds on existing practical and strategic co-operation and identifies a number of
key strands of work that can strengthen co-operation. Paragraph 2.1 provides for the
165 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland on Police Co-operation (April
2002).   
166 Cross-Border Organised Crime Assessment 2012, 10. 
North–South Irish Responses to Transnational Organised Crime  Research Report of Findings  |  49
S
ectio
n
 3
:
 Investigation and P
rosecution of O
rganised C
rim
e
21895_Brian Payne_Layout 1  13/03/2014  12:19  Page 49
establishment of a joint Tasking and Co-Ordination Group. Paragraph 2.5 sets out a mandate for
a proactive multi-agency immigration strategy for the policing of the borders between An Garda
Síochána, the PSNI, the UK Border Agency, and the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.
In addition, paragraph 3.1 calls for an examination of legislation with a view to putting forward
proposals to respective departments that would enhance current cross-border crime fighting
functions. Other measures include intelligence sharing,167 cross-border communication,168 and
enhanced training.169 One example of good practice is the establishment of the Cross-Border
Tobacco Fraud Enforcement Group, consisting of An Garda Síochána (Criminal Assets Bureau,
in particular), the PSNI, HMRC, Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs, and SOCA (NCA).170 
Finally, judicial co-operation is worth mentioning. The Recorder of Belfast stated that regular
communications take place with judges in Ireland. Therefore, an informal approach is also
facilitated at the judicial level. In addition, judges in the island of Ireland have opportunities to
meet on a regular basis, particularly through the Judicial Studies Board where a few joint meetings
take place. There is also a conference every two years or so, similar to the law enforcement cross-
border conference. These regular contacts have helped judges to build mutual trust and
confidence. While judges would like to see more opportunities like this, it was noted that a lack
of funding has prevented this.
While the legislative frameworks and their implementation in relation to cross-border co-operation
seem sufficient, some issues and problems have been identified simultaneously. Cross-border
surveillance is one such example. In Europe, this is facilitated by the Schengen Acquis noted
above. Article 40 permits authorised cross-border surveillance, and in urgent cases it also allows
surveillance of up to 5 hours without prior authorisation. Article 41 touches upon hot pursuit. The
United Kingdom has opted into article 40 but not article 41. The central government has recently
expressed its view that article 40 is a quite effective arrangement compared to ILORs, which are
slow and time-consuming.171 Consequently, it is likely that the United Kingdom will remain part
of this arrangement. In contrast, Ireland opted into neither of these provisions. Similarly, in relation
to customs co-operation, the United Kingdom decided not to be part of the hot pursuit provision
of the Naples II Convention, and Ireland has opted out of hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance,
and covert investigation.172 Effective communication and co-ordination may not necessitate
the UK law enforcement officers continuing any surveillance into Ireland as that task may
be taken up by their Irish counterparts instead. However, in extremely urgent circumstances
where communication or co-ordination is not possible, it would be helpful to have an option
of continued surveillance for a limited period. Some officers interviewed also supported
this. Therefore, Ireland might consider opting into article 40 of the Schengen Acquis as well
as relevant provisions of the Naples II Convention. However, the importance of clarifying
the issue of accountability was highlighted by the ICCL.
Another point to be noted is the reluctance of An Garda Síochána to take an active part in JITs
despite the existence of domestic legislation. When asked about this, many Garda officers did
not see the need for this facility as they regarded the current arrangements between the two
jurisdictions as sufficient. Normally cases with a cross-border element are dealt with through
50 |  AHRC Research Project
167 paras 4.1 and 4.2. 
168 paras 5.1 and 5.2. 
169 para 6.1.
170 Dail Eirann Debate, Written Answer 169, ‘Illicit Trade in Tobacco’ (54483/13) (18 December 2013). 
171 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The UK’s Block Opt-Out of Pre-Lisbon Criminal Law and Policing Measures (October 2013), paras 346-349.
172 Customs and Excise (Mutual Assistance) Act 2001. 
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parallel investigations by the PSNI and the Garda with information passed back and forward
informally, or through ILORs for transfer of evidence. The fact that the island of Ireland is based
upon the common law tradition also facilitates smoother co-operation compared to other
European jurisdictions. One officer also described how this policy only works properly when both
parties have an interest in an investigation. Problems can occur when law enforcement agencies
in one jurisdiction have little interest in an investigation and must be persuaded to deploy
additional resources by their counterparts across the border. It was also noted that investigators
naturally would like to guard their intelligence as much as possible, but they would have to involve
other stakeholders if JITs were to be set up, potentially causing problems in terms of data
protection. However, PSNI officers frequently expressed the benefits that JITs have for cross-
border co-operation as they do not require a long process such as ILORs, allowing people to ‘get
on with their job’. Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs is also quite active in facilitating JITs with
HMRC based upon the Naples II Convention. Therefore, the time may be ripe for the An Garda
Síochána to consider facilitating this regime more proactively.
Moreover, there is still room for improvement in the day-to-day co-operation between police
officers on the ground to ensure that co-operation that is taking place at a higher level is
implemented in practice. A similar sentiment was expressed by prosecutors. In particular, there
is sometimes a lack of clarity on whether the PSNI or the Garda are leading an investigation. This
can have practical implications in terms of search and seizure, as well as the testing of forensic
evidence, and once again the benefit of JITs should be reiterated here.
While respecting the usefulness and benefits of informal co-operation which already exists
between both jurisdictions, many of the difficulties mentioned in this section could be
alleviated by more regular face-to-face contacts. Although annual cross-border conferences
noted above are important, their usefulness has been questioned in terms of their ability
to facilitate relevant, substantial, and continuing discussions on law enforcement matters.
In addition, this conference seems to be more police-focused and does not appear to be as
relevant to other agencies. In this regard, the establishment of a cross-border multi-agency
taskforce on organised crime, which would examine all aspects of organised crime and
meet several times a year, may be a way forward not only for information/intelligence
exchange but also for strengthening mutual trust. A starting point perhaps is for the North-
South Ministerial Council, established by the Good Friday Agreement 1998, to add justice
as one of the areas of co-operation.
3.4.4 The Role of European Union Agencies in Cross-Border Co-operation
3.4.4.1 Eurojust
Eurojust was established in 2002 to strengthen the fight against serious and organised crime
within the EU Member States. The legal basis for its operation has undergone a series of
amendments, with the most relevant instrument being the Council Decision adopted in 2009.173
Its main body, Eurojust College, consists of National Members from each Member State who are
police officers, prosecutors, or judges in their respective jurisdictions. Its main function is to co-
ordinate and assist the investigation and prosecution of crimes with a cross-border dimension,
173 [2009] OJ L 138/14. It should be mentioned here that a new Proposal to reform Eurojust is under consideration. See Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), COM (2013) 535 final (July).  
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and to this end it hosts co-ordination meetings with relevant Member States on a regular basis.
It also deals with ILORs, EAWs, and provides funding and expertise to set up JITs.
Much of Eurojust’s work relates to organised crime. In 2012, of the 1,533 cases that Eurojust
processed, 727 related to drug trafficking, human trafficking/smuggling, money laundering, and
criminal groups.174 The UK and Irish National Desks of Eurojust are contacted regularly by the
law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions if crimes have an European dimension, and
they are normally quick in providing required information and identifying colleagues in other
Member States who might be able to help further. JITs are also co-ordinated by Eurojust in many
cases. One recent example is a JIT organised by Northern Ireland and Sweden in relation to
human trafficking in April 2013. The PSNI and the PPS worked together with their Swedish
colleagues, resulting in two convictions and victims being rescued.
Interestingly, the UK National Member of Eurojust noted that there is scope for the agency to be
better utilised by the law enforcement community in Northern Ireland. While the United Kingdom
has the most JITs benefitting from funding provided by Eurojust, the majority of them involve
England and Wales, and there is scope for Northern Ireland to make more proactive use of this.
That said, Northern Ireland is involved in a number of JITs, and the expectation is that this number
will increase. Also, while a judge can be a National Member, there is not representation from the
United Kingdom judiciary. The UK National Member explained that this is due to the differences
in criminal justice systems across Europe. In continental Europe, investigative judges in the civil
law jurisdictions are part of criminal investigations, and therefore are eligible to be part of a JIT
(in some cases as a JIT leader). In contrast, this is not the case in common law systems such as
the United Kingdom and Ireland. When asked whether the Eurojust UK National Desk should also
have a representative (eg a prosecutor) from Northern Ireland, the National Member stated that
although this might be helpful, it may be difficult for the PPS to justify as there are currently not
enough cases being forwarded to Eurojust. The UK National Desk and the PPS also work well
remotely through regular communication. Further, the PPS is also a member of the Eurojust
Consultative Forum of Prosecutors at a senior level, and attends meetings when required.
This under-utilisation is even more evident in Ireland. According to the Eurojust Annual Report
2012, 17 requests for assistance were received by Eurojust from the Irish law enforcement
community. The Irish National Member participated in only 3 co-ordination meetings in 2012,
compared to 46 meetings for the UK National Member.175 This figure alone does not clearly
indicate that Eurojust is under-utilised by the Irish law enforcement community. It may be that
the majority of the cases do not require the involvement of Eurojust as the Garda already works
quite well with its counterparts in other Member States. In that regard, Detective Chief
Superintendent Eugene Corcoran confirmed that there are other avenues more traditionally used
by the police—Europol and Interpol being two.
One way to make the work of Eurojust more relevant to the Irish law enforcement community
could be to have a representative from the An Garda Síochána. When asked about this possibility,
Garda officers were somewhat hesitant. Detective Chief Superintendent Eugene Corcoran noted
52 |  AHRC Research Project
174 Eurojust, Annual Report 2012, 58-59.  
175 ibid 62.  
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that Gardaí already had someone in place at Europol and there would be a risk of duplication of
effort if the same policy were to be applied to Eurojust. While their views and the current state
of affairs should be respected, Eurojust does bring some benefits, such as funding to
conduct JITs. Therefore, An Garda Síochána should consider using its services more
proactively.
3.4.4.2 Europol
The European Police Office (Europol) was originally established in 1995 and became operational
in 1999. Similarly to Eurojust, the legal basis for its operation has undergone a series of
amendments, the most relevant instrument being the Council Decision adopted in 2009.176
Europol does not have the power to conduct its own investigation across Europe. Like Eurojust,
its main role is facilitation and co-ordination of criminal investigations among Member States as
well as intelligence gathering. Interviews in both jurisdictions revealed that Europol were contacted
frequently. Some issues noted in Northern Ireland included the fact that the PSNI do not yet have
access to the Europol European Information System and this can only be done through the NCA.
Allowing such access could contribute to speedy implementation of an appropriate
response, and therefore the UK government should consider this. Further, the benefits of
incorporating a Northern Ireland desk at Europol were also raised and should be explored,
as other agencies such as NCA and HMRC have representations.
In Ireland, it was noted that An Garda Síochána communicates and co-ordinates activities
regularly with Europol through its National Europol Office. A good example of co-operation is
‘Operation Oakleaf’ conducted in 2013 which involved the theft and smuggling of Rhino horn
artefacts, primarily by a group of travellers from Rathkeale in County Limerick. The cross-border
nature of this crime and the large profits that it produces have attracted the interest of Europol,
which worked closely with An Garda Síochána to achieve significant prosecutions and the seizure 
of assets.
In summary, European agencies have played and continue to play an important role in facilitating
cross-border co-operation, and both jurisdictions benefit from their services occasionally.
However, given that the existing bilateral arrangements seem to be working well and that these
are much simpler and less time-consuming, it was discovered that there is, in practice, little use
of these agencies when it comes to cross-border co-operation between the two jurisdictions.
176 [2009] OJ L 121/37. Similar to Eurojust, a Proposal to reform Europol is under consideration. See Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Co-operation and Training (Europol),  COM (2013) 173 final (March).  
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Section 4: Criminal
Proceedings and Confiscation
of Criminal Proceeds
Offences relating to organised crime are tried in a number of different courts depending on their
circumstances in both jurisdictions. The vast majority of all criminal offences are tried summarily
in magistrates’ courts in Northern Ireland and in the District Courts in Ireland. Magistrates have
powers to sentence defendants up to 12 months where indictable offences are being tried
summarily. Similarly, the District Courts in Ireland can sentence defendants for minor offences
up to 12 months. The more serious indictable offences are tried in the Crown Court in Northern
Ireland. In Ireland, these are tried in the Circuit Court or the Central Criminal Court (where the
High Court exercises criminal jurisdiction). The former does not have jurisdiction over murder,
rape, aggravated sexual assault, treason, and piracy, all of which are heard in the Central Criminal
Court. Finally, offences relating to terrorism or organised crime can be tried before the SCC.
4.1 Trial Without Jury
A significant feature of criminal proceedings in both jurisdictions is the existence of trial by jury.
Having said this, there are certain arrangements under which a trial can be held without jury, and
this applies to organised crime as well. In Northern Ireland, the Justice and Security (Northern
Ireland) Act 2007 allows the DPP to issue a certificate that any trial on indictment be conducted
without a jury where the offences involve ‘proscribed’ organisations and he/she is satisfied that
there is a risk of administration of justice being impaired. Such trials came to be known as ‘Diplock
trials’ in this jurisdiction (and are still widely referred to as such) because it was Lord Diplock’s
report into emergency procedures in Northern Ireland in 1972 that recommended this
arrangement. As noted elsewhere, paramilitary groups commit organised crime, and this
legislation can be used to prosecute them. It is important to highlight here that the 2007 Act
provides for limited judicial scrutiny of decisions made by the DPP. They cannot be questioned
in any court of law except on the grounds of dishonesty, bad faith, or other exceptional
circumstances (including a lack of jurisdiction or error of law) or on the ground that there has
been an infringement of a Convention right.177 In order to enhance and maintain the legitimacy
of the non-jury trial and public confidence in law enforcement, it is recommended that the
legislation is amended to allow a greater degree of judicial scrutiny over the DPP’s
decisions.
In addition, there is a provision under section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 whereby an
application may be made for a non-jury trial due to a risk of jury tampering. In practice, a non-
177 Justice and Security Act 2007, s 7(1). An unsuccessful challenge was made, for example, in Re Brian and Paula Arthurs [2010] NIQB 75.   
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jury trial under this Act is rare for organised crime, and this has been confirmed by the Recorder
of Belfast.178  This is partly due to the difficulty in getting concrete evidence of intimidation. It is
also important to note that a higher threshold is set when offences do not involve proscribed
organisations. First, there is judicial oversight over applications by the DPP. Second, a judge must
be satisfied, among other matters, that there is evidence of a real and present danger that jury
tampering would take place. Given the culture of fear noted elsewhere, proving this might be
difficult. What is desirable, then, is a more proactive approach in addressing jury tampering
and intimidation. One example of good practice is the aforementioned 2007 Act under which
jury members are now identified by numbers, thereby protecting their personal
information.179 
When asked whether a non-jury trial is appropriate for cases involving organised crime, the
Recorder of Belfast and Justice McCloskey of the High Court stated that it would be, provided
that sufficient safeguards exist to protect the rights of defendants. The Northern Ireland Affairs
Committee also shares this view.180 It is worth pointing out here that the absence of a jury trial
itself does not automatically result in a violation of the right to a fair trial,181 and the ECHR does
not specifically provide for this, for the reason that other jurisdictions, particularly in civil law
States, do not have this tradition. In relation to the creation of a Southern-style Special Court for
organised crime, the Recorder of Belfast and a defence lawyer stated that it would not be
necessary as the current arrangements would be sufficient. Justice McCloskey also stated that
this would be a political question for the legislature.
However, there are some immediate steps which the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland should
take. The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 has created an offence of jury
intimidation, similar to the offence under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in
England and Wales, with a punishment of 5 years’ imprisonment. Intimidation of witnesses
attracts the same level of penalty as noted above. In addition, the 2007 Act imposes a penalty of
up to 2 years’ imprisonment for disclosure of jury information.182 Given the need to tackle the
culture of fear prevalent in Northern Ireland, the research team regards these punishment
regimes as too lenient. By way of comparison, jury and witness intimidation in Ireland
attracts 15 years’ imprisonment, as noted elsewhere. This once again is an example of good
practice and the United Kingdom should follow suit.
In Ireland, jury trial is protected by article 38.5 of the Constitution, which provides that, save in
certain circumstances, ‘no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury’. Article 38.3
of the Constitution states that special courts may be established for the trial of offences in cases
where it may be determined in accordance with such law that the ordinary courts are inadequate
to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of public peace and order.
Section 35(2) of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 further permits the government to issue
proclamations establishing special courts, and the current SCC came into effect in 1972. Although
the Irish government justified the reintroduction of the Court in 1972 on the basis of the paramilitary
threat of terrorism, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of the SCC for dealing with organised
crime where it is believed that juries are prevented from doing justice.183
56 |  AHRC Research Project
178 One case worth mentioning is R v Clarke and Anor [2010] NICC 7, concerning tiger kidnapping.  In this case, McCloskey J (and subsequently upheld by the Court
of Appeal), recognised the existence of jury intimidation and proceeded to try the case without jury.   
179 In Re McParland [2008] NIQB 1, the Northern Ireland High Court held that jury anonymity did not breach art 6 of the ECHR as the policy pursues a clear and
proper public objective of preventing jury intimidation.  
180 Report on Fuel Laundering and Smuggling, 22. 
181 Kavanagh v Ireland, before the UN Human Rights Committee. Communication no 89/1998, CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998 para 10.1.
182 s 10.  
183 DPP v Quilligan [1986] IR 495.
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The SCC has jurisdiction over ‘scheduled offences’ set out in the Offences Against the State
(Scheduled Offences) Order 1972, unless the DPP directs otherwise in a specific case, and over
cases that are certified by the DPP that in his/her opinion the ordinary courts are inadequate to
secure the administration of justice.184 These range from illegal possession of firearms to offences
under the Offences Against the State Acts. The scope of ‘scheduled offences’ was extended by
section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 so that offences involving criminal
organisations (eg participating in criminal organisations or committing offences for such
organisations) will go to the SCC unless the DPP directs otherwise. When asked about the SCC,
all the Garda officers and prosecutors interviewed stated that it is a valuable resource that has
strengthened the ability to prosecute organised crime. In particular, intimidation of juries was said
to have been prevented more effectively because of this Court. It is worth noting in this regard
that between 2006 and 2011, over 50 convictions resulted from section 41 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1999.185 Some also argued that for some complex organised crime cases, a judge-only court
might be desirable.
However, a number of criticisms have been raised against the SCC. During the drafting stage of
the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, a group of 133 practising lawyers published a letter186
setting out objections to the abolition of jury trial. For example, the DPP already had a general
power to refer offences to the SCC; therefore, there was no need for additional legislation.
Defence lawyers and a human rights organisation interviewed also stated that issues like
intimidation could be adequately managed by a trial judge deciding in a particular instance to
waive a jury in response to a particular threat.187 One defence lawyer additionally argued that the
SCC might be counterproductive in practice, as it makes martyrs of convicted people and projects
an image that they are treated differently from others. Finally, a lack of transparency in the
procedure has been raised as a concern. Despite these criticisms, the establishment of the SCC
in Ireland was upheld as constitutional.188 In addition, in the recent case of Donohoe v Ireland
(2013),189 concerning opinion evidence provided by a senior Garda officer before the SCC, the
European Court of Human Rights was satisfied that in the circumstances of this case where the
officer’s evidence was not the sole or decisive evidence grounding the applicant’s conviction,
sufficient procedural safeguards were in place for the SCC to protect the right to a fair trial. The
importance of these decisions should be recognised.
In practice, it was discovered that there have not been very many cases of organised crime tried
before the SCC. According to the Irish Court Service, there were 10 trials before the SCC in 2012,
down from 13 in 2011.190 This demonstrates that the majority of cases are tried by jury without
any difficulty. A majority of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts 1939-
98 nevertheless considered at the time of its report in 2002 that the threat posed by organised
crime was sufficient to justify the continuation of the SCC.191 However, it simultaneously took a
note of the decision by the United Nations Human Rights Committee which highlighted the failure
of Ireland to demonstrate that the DPP’s certification for the applicant to be tried by the SCC was
based upon reasonable and objective grounds.192 It eventually recommended that the distinction
between scheduled and non-scheduled offences should no longer be retained on the ground that
decisions of the DPP ought to be based on the merits of the individual case rather than some
184 ss 36 and 46(1).
185 Law Reform Commission, Report on Jury Service (April 2013), 93.
186 The Irish Times, ‘Leading Lawyers Call for Bill on Gangs to Be Withdrawn’ (3 July 2009).
187 See also Irish Human Rights Commission, Observations on the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 2009, 6, and ICCL, Combating Organised Crime and Respecting
the Rule of Law: Human Rights Based Alternatives to the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 2009, 5.
188 Kavanagh v Ireland [1996] 1 IR 348, 354.
189 App no 19165/08. 
190 Court Service Annual Report 2012, 23.  
191 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Act 1939-1998 and Related Matters (2002).
192 Kavanagh v Ireland, Communication no 89/1998, CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998.
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preconceived statutory assumption that persons charged with scheduled offences should be
sent to the SCC.193 Currently, the DPP’s powers under the Offences Against the State Act 1939
and the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 are not scrutinised judicially, and the Committee
also recommended that any decision of the DPP should be subject to a positive judicial review
mechanism. These recommendations were also highlighted by the Irish Human Rights
Commission194 and the Law Reform Commission.195 The latter in particular considered that there
was a strong argument in favour of a re-examination of the operations of the SCC. In order to
boost public confidence, the research team considers it desirable that cases should only
be sent to the SCC after a consideration on the merits of each case whether or not the
ordinary courts are adequate, and that there should be a mechanism for judicial scrutiny in
respect of all cases that are sent to the SCC.
4.2 Evidential Issues
There are several evidential issues to be highlighted. In relation to witness intimidation, some
measures have been introduced in both jurisdictions. Article 20 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence)
(Northern Ireland) Order 2004 makes provision for the admissibility of the previous oral and
documentary statements of witnesses who do not give evidence through fear, and article 23
provides for the admissibility of prior statements inconsistent with a witness’s testimony for the
purpose of proving its truth. In Ireland, section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 allows for the
admissibility of a statement of a witness where the witness either (a) refuses to give evidence, (b)
denies making the statement, or (c) gives evidence which is materially inconsistent with it,
provided that the defence can cross-examine the witness. The Deputy DPP in Ireland has
confirmed that this is useful in addressing witness intimidation. This provision has to date
withstood human rights and constitutional challenge. However, an important point was expressed
that a more effective witness protection scheme should be implemented so that there is no need
to rely on section 16,196 and this view was supported by defence lawyers as well as a human
rights organisation interviewed.
Another important matter is disclosure of evidence. This is essential for ensuring a fair trial for
the suspects of organised crime.197 The duty to disclose evidence is stipulated, inter alia, in the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (as amended) in the United Kingdom as well as
the Constitution of Ireland.198 One of the difficulties in relation to organised crime is that the
intelligence gathered is often of a sensitive nature, and this requires the law enforcement
communities in both jurisdictions to protect its sources as well as the means and methods of
intelligence gathering. Consequently, the prosecutorial authorities may decide that they do not
wish to disclose certain evidence. In the United Kingdom, so-called public interest immunity can
be granted by the court for this purpose under the 1996 Act, and a similar arrangement exists in
Ireland under ‘public interest privilege’. An added safeguard is provided for non-jury trial in
Northern Ireland, as a separate judge is selected to address disclosure issues. The CPS in
England has issued guidance on public interest immunity to ensure that its prosecutors comply
with relevant legislation and human rights.199 In addition to the Code for Prosecutors, which
58 |  AHRC Research Project
193 ibid paras 9.57 and 9.64.  
194 Irish Human Rights Commission, Observations on the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Bill 2009, 6-7.
195 Law Reform Commission, Report on Jury Service (April 2013), 95.  
196 Third Discussion Document, 37.
197 Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom, App no 28901/95 (2000).
198 Arts 38 and 40.  
199 CPS, ‘<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/disclosure_manual_chapter_8/> accessed 20 February 2014.  
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includes a section on disclosure, the PPS has also produced a comprehensive and detailed
Disclosure Manual which provides guidance on handling highly sensitive material and public
interest immunity. This is complemented by the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure
(2005). The DPP in Ireland has detailed guidance for this under the ‘Disclosure’ section of the
Guidelines for Prosecutors (2010). In any event, the need for this measure has also been
recognised by the UK judiciary:
Circumstances may arise in which material held by the prosecution and
tending to undermine the prosecution or assist the defence cannot be
disclosed to the defence, fully or even at all, without the risk of serious
prejudice to an important public interest. The public interest most regularly
engaged is that in the effective investigation and prosecution of serious crime,
which may involve resort to informers and under-cover agents, or the use of
scientific or operational techniques (such as surveillance) which cannot be
disclosed without exposing individuals to the risk of personal injury or
jeopardising the success of future operations. In such circumstances some
derogation from the golden rule of full disclosure may be justified but such
derogation must always be the minimum derogation necessary to protect the
public interest in question and must never imperil the overall fairness of the
trial.200 
It is important to add here that withholding of evidence is not an automatic violation of the right
to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR, provided, among others, that the procedure is authorised
by an independent judge.201 Both the United Kingdom and Ireland comply with this generally
because of the requirement for judicial oversight. This was recently confirmed in Twomey and
Cameron v United Kingdom and Guthrie v United Kingdom, both of which were jointly heard in
2013.202 These cases related to non-disclosure of evidence in relation to the jury tampering
provision in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 noted above, and the European Court of Human Rights
concluded that the Act contained sufficient safeguards to maintain the applicants’ right to a fair
trial. Further, in the aforementioned case of Donohoe v Ireland, the European Court of Human
Rights reached a similar conclusion in relation to the non-disclosure of the sources of opinion
evidence.
In practice, it seems that an application for public interest immunity or privilege is common in
relation to serious crimes, including organised crime. One difficulty which has been identified by
the law enforcement communities and judges in both jurisdictions is the protection of witnesses
during criminal investigation and proceedings. They confirmed that sometimes they must stop
criminal prosecutions and proceedings in order to protect the article 2 right (the right to life) of
informants and/or witnesses rather than disclosing their identities to the defence. A related point
is the existence of a so-called ‘innocence at stake’ exception in Ireland. Under this, disclosure is
regarded as necessary where the evidence in question could show the innocence of suspects.203
200 R v H [2004] UKHL 3.  
201 Doorson v The Netherlands, App no 20524/92 (1996), Jasper v United Kingdom, App no 27052/95 (2000), and A and Others v United Kingdom, App no 3455/05
(2009).   
202 App nos 67318/09 and 22226/12.  
203 Marks v Beyfus (1890) QBD 494.
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This can still put the life of informants and witnesses at risk, and under such circumstances the
prosecution would generally be discontinued.204 These practices clearly demonstrate that
prosecutors and judges in both jurisdictions carefully consider the human rights of relevant
individuals involved in the criminal proceedings and balance competing interests appropriately.
Another interesting issue relating to evidence is the use of intercepts in court. At present, evidence
collected from the interception of telecommunications is not admissible in court.205 The UK
government has previously commissioned a Privy Council Review206 led by The Rt Hon. Sir John
Chilcot with the terms of reference to advise on whether a regime to allow the use of intercepted
material in court could be devised. The Chilcot report, regarded as the most authoritative on
intercept evidence, raised a number of risks in allowing such evidence to be used,207 including
exposure of sensitive materials and sources of intelligence as well as means and methods of
intelligence gathering. In the end, the report concluded that the use of intercept evidence in
criminal trials should be used in order to effectively combat serious and organised crime, provided
it utilised a robust legal model based in statute and compatibility with the ECHR. The Privy Council
also received a number of written submissions208 from Northern Ireland law enforcement agencies
highlighting a number of additional issues. These included the use of non-jury trials which resulted
in more stringent disclosure requirements and uncertainty surrounding the combined
reserved/devolved nature of the jurisdiction. It was also noted that the use of intercept evidence
had implications in terms of articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, and that legal challenges might increase
on this and other human rights grounds.
The prospect for using intercept evidence drew mixed responses in interviews in Northern Ireland.
Some respondents from the PSNI, SOCA, and (from an operational perspective) the PPS felt that
the benefits that might result from using this method (eg an increase in the number of successful
prosecutions and the ability to target the senior members of organised crime groups) outweighed
the risks. However, one prosecutor reflected that intercept materials are not necessarily ‘the magic
bullet for dealing with organised crime.’ There are limits to how effective it is, because there is a
difficulty in identifying who is speaking and what is being discussed. Criminals also use coded
language to avoid getting arrested. Consequently, reliability of intercept evidence can be called
into question. In the end, Justice McCloskey of the High Court stated that there is no lacuna or
need to press for the use of intercept evidence in practice as the prosecution can use other
reliable evidence.
In Ireland, while the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages
(Regulation) Act 1993 does not specifically prohibit the use of intercept evidence in court, it is
not relied upon as a matter of practice.209 Garda officers stated that they would prefer that this
facility be used only for intelligence-gathering purposes. The reasons are similar to those raised
above, including a difficulty in identifying the actual speakers, a risk of alerting criminals about
the means and methods of intelligence gathering, and a possible negative impact on public
confidence in law enforcement. In any event, there also does not seem to be a pressing need to
rely on intercept evidence in relation to organised crime in Ireland. One anomaly is that the use
of intercept evidence obtained abroad may be admissible in both jurisdictions.210 While
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205 RIPA, s 17.  
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judges have discretion not to admit such evidence in practice, there does not seem to be a
justification for this separate treatment. Setting aside the legality and State practice of
admitting intercept evidence in other jurisdictions, the same issues highlighted above,
including its reliability, the danger of exposing intelligence gathering, and the human rights
dimensions, should also be relevant to the intercept evidence obtained elsewhere. An
argument therefore could be made to examine this issue further in order to promote
consistency and public confidence.
Finally, there are potential human rights concerns over the provision of opinion evidence in Ireland.
One issue is the inability to cross-examine sufficiently when a Garda officer claims privilege in
relation to his/her opinion evidence. Defence lawyers expressed some uneasiness in this regard.
The position of the Irish Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal has been that article 38 of the
Constitution and article 6 of the ECHR are not necessarily breached when Garda officers claim
privilege for their opinion evidence, provided that it is not the sole evidence.211 This has been
followed in a recent case of DPP v Desmond Donnelly, Gerard McGarrigle and James Murphy.212
The European Court of Human Rights has also adopted similar reasoning in Al-Khawaja and
Tahery v The United Kingdom (2011).213 In addressing the admission of evidence from witnesses
not present in court (and therefore not cross-examinable), the European Court of Human Rights
held that this would not result in a breach of the right to a fair trial, provided that such evidence
is not the sole or decisive evidence.214 One point to note is that the above Irish jurisprudence
applies to ‘unlawful organisations’ within the meaning of the Offences Against the State Act 1939,
and the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1972 stipulates that opinion evidence must
come from officers not below the rank of Chief Superintendent. This was to establish trust and
credibility for such evidence.215 In contrast, under the Criminal Justice Act 2006 as amended by
the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, opinion evidence in relation to the existence of
‘criminal organisations’ can be given by ‘any’ Garda officer. It is important to note here that the
opinion evidence in this context is more limited than the Offences Against the State Acts as it is
not admissible to prove that a particular defendant was in any way connected with criminal
organisations. However, in order to maintain credibility of such evidence and consistency in
law enforcement, the 2009 Act should be amended so that opinion evidence is restricted to
high-ranking Garda officers.
4.3 Sentencing
A frequent theme running throughout the interviews was that penalties imposed in relation to
organised crime offences are too lenient. For example, it appears that the sentences imposed in
Northern Ireland for fiscal/excise fraud are generally lower than in England and Wales.216 Between
2002 and 2012, there were only 4 prosecutions for fuel fraud that resulted in custodial sentences
(ranging from a few months to 2.5 years) with the majority of criminals receiving suspended
sentences or fines.217 Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris also stated that suspended
sentences for fuel fraud seem to be the norm in Northern Ireland,218 and the Parliamentary
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee expressed a view that the punishment regime for this crime
211 DPP v Kelly [2006] 3 IR 115. See also DPP v Binead [2007] 1 IR374.
212 [2012] IECCA 78.
213 App nos 26766/05 and 22228/06.  
214 See also Donohoe v Ireland.  
215 DPP v Kelly.
216 Report on Fuel Laundering and Smuggling, 21.  
217 ibid 39 and 95.  
218 ibid 74.  
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did not serve as strong deterrence.219 The same picture emerges in Ireland according to the
officers of Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs. In relation to drug offences, a total of 1,331 penalties
were imposed by the Dublin Circuit Court in 2012.220 Of these, only 222 involved custodial
sentences.221 Similarly in Northern Ireland, the available crime statistics reveal that, of 1,105
penalties for drug offences in 2009, custodial sentences were imposed in 173 cases.222 In addition,
sentencing for human trafficking also raises some concerns. In the aforementioned Matyas Pis
case, the defendant received 3 years’ imprisonment for trafficking offences (18 months on remand
followed by 18 months on licence). It is understandable that matters such as a guilty plea, a lack
of deception/coercion, and the defendant’s previous good character were taken into
consideration. Although the judge in the case made it clear that trafficking offences should always
attract custodial sentences without exceptional circumstances, it is somewhat difficult to regard
the sentence imposed as ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. The lighter punishments in
the island of Ireland can potentially make it more vulnerable to forum shopping and concentration
of criminal activities as noted above, and this would certainly go against the aim of creating a
hostile environment for criminals.
A few more points on sentencing should be highlighted. Defence lawyers have stated that the
courts seem to be reluctant to impose heavy custodial sentences upon offenders at the lower
end of the food chain even if they have actually committed crimes. HMRC has additionally argued
that large confiscation orders are sometimes viewed as mitigation against custodial sentences
rather than being in addition to them, and this was also pointed out by the DPP.223 This goes
against section 163(4) of the POCA which provides that ‘the court must leave the confiscation
order out of account in deciding the appropriate sentence for the defendant.’224 Finally, many
law enforcement officers in both jurisdictions also recognised a difficulty in prosecuting and
punishing leaders or bosses of criminal organisations. In the end, a question has been raised by
the law enforcement community as to whether the serious nature of organised crime is
understood by the judiciary.
In response, the Recorder of Belfast and Justice McCloskey of the High Court expressed a view
that the sentences passed are appropriate as judges have to take various factors, including
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, into consideration. This view is shared by Justice
Butler of the High Court and the SCC in Ireland, who also pointed out that discretion is important
so that judges can address the various issues on a case-by-case basis. Judge Miller of the Belfast
Crown Court also made an important point that a sentence reflects the gravity of evidence. He
gave an example of cigarette and fuel smuggling where sentences are sometimes lower. This
means that the law enforcement community also has an important role to play by presenting high-
quality evidence if it wants to see an appropriate sentence passed.
There is the possibility for the DPP in both jurisdictions to refer unduly lenient sentences to the
Court of Appeal within 28 days of the original judgment.225 According to the PPS, the power of
the DPP is exercised only exceptionally in a small percentage of cases. This suggests that the
majority of the sentencing decisions are regarded as appropriate by prosecutors. Also, the DPP’s
reference generally applies to indictable offences (before the Crown Court) only, and a difficulty
62 |  AHRC Research Project
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220 Court Service Annual Report 2012, 36.  
221 ibid. 
222 Department of Justice, Northern Ireland Conviction and Sentencing Statistics 2009, 6.  
223 Report on Fuel Laundering and Smuggling, 95.  
224 The Sentencing Guidelines Council in England and Wales also makes this point clear in Sentencing For Fraud: Definitive Guidelines, 14.  
225 Criminal Justice Act 1988, Pt IV, as amended by Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, s 41.
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arises when particular conduct is a ‘hybrid’ offence (ie an offence that may be tried either on
indictment of summarily), although the Secretary of State may include these offences through
statutory instruments.226 As one  official of the Department of Justice explained:
The concern is that there have been too few custodial sentences, and the way
to address that is through the process of making them referable so that you
can send them to the Court of Appeal and say that in these circumstances a
custodial sentence is appropriate.
It is important to recognise here that the Northern Ireland government has taken some steps to
rectify this problem for some forms of organised crime. For example, fiscal/excise fraud under
section 170 of the Customs and Management Act 1979 was not previously referable to the Court
of Appeal. This changed with the adoption of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Review of Sentencing)
Order (Northern Ireland) 2013 which came into force in December 2013. A similar action was
taken in relation to trafficking for labour exploitation by the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Act
2013. These are examples of good practice and demonstrate the commitment of Northern Ireland
to make this jurisdiction a hostile environment for criminals to operate. However, an offence of
money laundering under the POCA is not currently referable, and this should be rectified,
given the important implication this has for the confiscation of criminal proceeds.
In Ireland, the DPP can also refer unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Criminal Appeal within
28 days of the original judgment.227 There is a rate of approximately 30 referrals annually (most
of which are not organised crime). Similar to Northern Ireland, the Court of Criminal Appeal would
not intervene unless it can be shown that there has been a substantial departure from what would
be regarded as the appropriate sentence.228 Also, the DPP can only refer sentences imposed
upon conviction on indictment. This means that summary conviction, which applies to offences
including fiscal/excise fraud, is not referable in this jurisdiction. In 2006, the Law Reform
Commission published a report entitled Consultation Paper on Prosecution Appeals from Unduly
Lenient Sentences in the District Court. After carefully examining arguments for and against
allowing appeals from the District Court, the Commission recommended that a procedure should
be introduced into Irish  law for appealing against unduly lenient sentences imposed in the District
Court.229 The research team supports this reform for organised crime, particularly in light
of that fact that 95% of the respondents (1,004 in total) to the Crime Survey Opinion Poll
(2010) stated that the government should take a tougher stance to combat organised
crime.230 In any event, Justice Butler of the High Court and the SCC stated that the Court of
Criminal Appeal can be active in increasing sentences (up to 50%, applying to all cases). The
frequency and percentage therefore are higher in this jurisdiction than in Northern Ireland.
Some of these issues can be addressed through the creation of clear sentencing guidelines on
organised crime that would enhance consistency in sentencing and public confidence in the
criminal justice systems. In this regard, a review of the existing guidelines (or the creation of new
226 One recent example is the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Reviews of Sentencing) Order 2006.  
227 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 2.
228 DPP v Byrne (1995) 1 ILRM 279.
229 95.
230 Red C, Crime Survey Opinion Poll 2010, 3. 
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ones where crimes were not sufficiently understood) was recommended by many of those
interviewed. In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council publishes Sentencing Guidelines on
various crimes to allow judges to seek consistency in sentencing and to facilitate public
understanding on the issue.231 Some of the relevant Guidelines include drug offences,232 fraud,233
and sexual offences (which includes a part on trafficking for sexual exploitation).234 One of the
main problems with these Guidelines is that they do not take into account sufficiently the
sophisticated and serious nature of organised criminality. The Sexual Offences Guidelines do not
clearly designate involvement of organised criminal gangs as an aggravating factor. The same is
true for the Drug Offences Guidelines. It is therefore recommended that the existing Guidelines
be reviewed and amended accordingly.
There is no body equivalent to the Sentencing Council in Northern Ireland. While the courts can
rely on the abovementioned Sentencing Guidelines produced by the Council, these are secondary,
and the guidelines developed by the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland take precedence.235 It
has been recognised that the Court of Appeal guidelines are a very effective way of sending a
clear message to the lower court and structuring judicial sentencing. Without casting doubts on
the ability of the Court of Appeal to provide effective guidance in many cases, one of the
difficulties is that without comprehensive guidelines governing all cases at all levels, there is the
risk that inconsistent sentences continue to be imposed by trial judges in Northern Ireland. This
can be exacerbated by a degree of subjectivity reflected in sentences depending on how factors
such as the ‘public interest’ or the ‘interests of justice’ are interpreted by individual judges. One
defence lawyer also made an important point that there can be no guidance until an issue is taken
up by the Court of Appeal, and this creates a possibility of some of the new/emerging forms of
criminality not receiving immediate and appropriate attention. In addition, a lack of published
guidelines prevents members of the general public from gaining better understanding of the
subject matter as they do not generally possess sufficient skills in legal research and analysis.
All of these point to a conclusion that it is desirable to have clear published guidelines for
organised crime in Northern Ireland.
It is important to mention a couple of recent developments on sentencing in this jurisdiction. The
Department of Justice Northern Ireland initiated a consultation on a Sentencing Guidelines
Mechanism in October 2010 in response to the Hillsborough Castle Agreement.236 The need to
achieve greater consistency and transparency was highlighted during consultation. The Northern
Ireland Assembly also commissioned research on comparative sentencing guidelines
mechanisms, which examined the role of various sentencing guidelines and bodies, and
suggested a number of issues for consideration.237 Alongside this, Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland has set up a Programme of Action on Sentencing that has sought to introduce new
guidelines for a range of offences identified in the consultation.238 Crimes such as fiscal/excise
fraud, human trafficking, and slavery/forced labour were mentioned. A sub-group to draft some
guidelines has been set up and is continuing its work as at the time of writing. It is hoped that
the sub-group pays sufficient attention to organised crime and provides clearer guidance
in the near future.
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231 Sentencing Council, <http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/> accessed 21 February 2014. 
232 Drug Offences: Definitive Guidelines (2012).
233 Sentencing for Fraud: Definitive Guidelines (2009).
234 Sexual Offences Act 2003: Definitive Guidelines (2007). This guideline is currently being reviewed.  
235 Attorney General's Reference (Number 1 of 2008), Gibbons and Others [2008] NICA 41 para 44.  
236 Department of Justice, Consultation on a Sentencing Guidelines Mechanism (October 2010), and Summary of Responses (March 2011).  
237 Northern Ireland Assembly, Comparative Research into Sentencing Guidelines Mechanisms (2011).
238 Sentencing Working Group, Monitoring and Developing Sentencing Guidance in Northern Ireland: A Report to the Lord Chief Justice (June 2010), and Report by
the Lord Chief Justice’s Sentencing Group (December 2012).  
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In Ireland, there is also no Sentencing Council. The appellate courts have begun to formulate
general sentencing guidance and, in some instances, specific guidelines, but not in the area of
organised crime. This lack of guidance may be mitigated to some extent by the fact that a serious
offence committed as part of, or in furtherance of, the activities of a criminal organisation is
statutorily treated as an aggravating factor.239 In this way, the chance of organised crime attracting
higher sentences is greater than in Northern Ireland, and this is an example of good practice.
However, clear guidelines on organised crime are still desirable, as stressed above. In 1996, the
Law Reform Commission recommended the introduction of sentencing guidelines on crime
generally in order to seek consistency in sentencing.240 In 2003, the Working Group on the
Jurisdiction of the Courts, chaired by Justice Fennelly of the Supreme Court, also recognised a
need to develop a system of objective guidance for sentencing judges at all levels and called for
a further independent study.241 Subsequently, the Department of Justice and Equality published
a White Paper on Crime, Discussion Document No. 2: Criminal Sanctions in 2010 as part of a
consultation process. Many submissions received were in favour of the creation of a sentencing
council and guidelines for clarity and coherence.242 These also noted that discretion and resultant
discrepancies in sentencing could damage public confidence.243 In order to address some of
these issues, the judiciary has established an online platform known as the ‘Irish Sentencing
Information System’244 that provides information on sentencing to judges. This can also be
accessed by the general public. However, concerns have been expressed about its long-term
sustainability.245 There is also currently no guidance on organised crime listed on this website.
More recently in 2013, the Law Reform Commission stated that the aforementioned Information
System could be supplemented by a dedicated body to formulate sentencing guidelines.246 In
particular, it highlighted the limitations inherent in relying upon guidance issued by the Court of
Criminal Appeal, such as the insufficient volume of sentencing appeals and a case-by-case
approach, potentially leading to inconsistency.247 When asked if there should be a body like the
Sentencing Council in Ireland, Justice Butler of the Irish High Court and the SCC stated that
clearer guidelines for serious offences were indeed desirable, and revealed that a similar system
to the Sentencing Council is currently being developed in Ireland. This is a welcome development.
4.4 Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds
In the United Kingdom, the main law governing confiscation of criminal proceeds is the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002, which provides the authorities with the power to freeze and confiscate criminal
proceeds and imposes an obligation on financial and other related institutions to disclose
suspicious transactions. This is in conformity with the Council Framework Decision on
Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property.248 There are two types
of confiscation stipulated under this legislation. The first is confiscation after a person is convicted
of a criminal offence and subsequently sentenced. A confiscation order can be issued by the
court in a separate proceeding if it is found that the defendant has benefited from his/her criminal
conduct.249 All in all, the Recorder of Belfast has stated that this element of the confiscation regime
239 Criminal Justice Act 2006, s 74 (as inserted by the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009). 
240 Law Reform Commission, Report on Sentencing (1996).
241 Working Group on the Jurisdiction of the Courts, The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Courts (2003), 172. 
242 White Paper on Crime Consultation Process: Criminal Sanctions, Overview of Written Submission Received (August 2010), 6.
243 ibid 11. 
244 ISIS, Irish Sentencing Information System <http://www.irishsentencing.ie/> accessed 28 February 2014. 
245 White Paper on Crime Consultation Process: Criminal Sanctions, Overview of Written Submission Received.
246 Law Reform Commission, Mandatory Sentences (2013), 35 and 40.  
247 ibid.  
248 [2005] OJ L159/223. See also Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Freezing and Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime in
European Union, COM (2012) 85 final.  
249 s 2 (England and Wales), s 92 (Scotland) and s 156 (Northern Ireland). Also see CPS, Proceeds of Crime Guidance: Confiscation and Ancillary Orders - Post POCA
2002.
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is rigorously applied in Northern Ireland. Another type of confiscation is civil recovery of proceeds
generated from unlawful conduct under Part 5 of the POCA. This can be instituted against
property worth more than £10,000 through civil proceedings before the High Court if it is satisfied
that the alleged unlawful conduct occurred to the civil standard of the ‘balance of probabilities’.250
According to the NCA officers interviewed, civil recovery investigations normally involve more
than one predicate offence, taking into account a number of relevant factors such as intelligence,
cash seizures, and tax offences, as well as people who may be affected. The research team has
also learned that over 95% of civil recovery in Northern Ireland was conducted previously by
SOCA. This underscores the importance and relevance of the work carried out by SOCA (and
now the NCA) in Northern Ireland.
Several important issues should be mentioned in relation to asset recovery. In the recent case of
Perry v Serious Organised Crime Agency,251 the UK Supreme Court held that the High Court had
no jurisdiction to make property freezing orders/civil recovery orders in relation to property held
outside of the United Kingdom. This has been changed to some extent by the Crime and Courts
Act 2013, under which a High Court in England and Wales may issue an order against property
held abroad if, among other grounds, a crime takes place wholly or partly in the United Kingdom
and/or a defendant is present in this jurisdiction.252 However, this provision does not extend to
Northern Ireland, thereby creating a law enforcement gap. Further, some human rights
concerns were also expressed in relation to civil recovery when there is no criminal conviction.
An important case in this regard is Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale.253 In this case, the
appellant claimed that the application of the civil standard in determining the existence of criminal
proceeds, particularly in the context of his acquittal in Portugal, was a breach of article 6(2) of
the ECHR (presumption of evidence). The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on the
grounds that the Part 5 POCA proceedings were not a ‘direct sequel’ or ‘a consequence and the
concomitant’ of any criminal proceedings, and that they were free-standing proceedings. The
European Court of Human Rights also upheld the compatibility of the civil recovery regime with
the ECHR in the past.254
More importantly in Northern Ireland, the ability to carry out civil recovery effectively has been
placed in doubt, and this is one area in which devolution has had a tangible impact. The National
Crime Agency (Limitation of Extension to Northern Ireland) Order 2013 permits the NCA to carry
out civil recovery functions in Northern Ireland but only in relation to non-transferred offences (eg
immigration and customs offences) and closely connected transferred offences.  To illustrate this
with an example, the NCA can investigate fuel laundering, which is a non-transferred offence. It
can simultaneously investigate a transferred offence of money laundering that is connected
closely to this offence. In reality, the research team discovered that the NCA does not address
the latter types of offences in the current political environment. This makes Northern Ireland more
vulnerable to money laundering and other criminal activities. A number of interviewees also
described a potential worst-case scenario where Northern Ireland is affected by inconsistent
implementation of civil recovery. The High Court in Northern Ireland can only make orders for
assets held in this jurisdiction. If civil recovery concerns assets held both in Belfast and in another
city in England, then an additional application must be made in that jurisdiction, leading to
66 |  AHRC Research Project
250 s 241. 
251 [2012] 3 WLR 379.
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duplication of efforts and resources. In addition, while the PPS can still perform the civil recovery
function, in an earlier submission to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, it noted that it had
no experience in using these civil recovery powers as these had been exercised by SOCA.255
Moreover, there are a number of other issues, including the need for more resources and
training.256 It was also pointed out that, unlike the CPS in England and Wales, the PPS enjoys
no indemnity against claims for costs in the event of a failed attempt to recover assets by these
means.257 When asked if it was possible for the PSNI to take on civil recovery functions, Detective
Chief Superintendent Roy McComb noted that time-consuming changes to legislation at a
national level would be required if the PSNI were to be provided with confiscation powers under
the POCA regime. In light of this problem, a workable compromise was suggested by some
representatives of the Policing Board that would allow the NCA to conduct civil recovery in relation
to all forms of organised crime, in addition to reserved matters such as immigration and taxation.
The research team takes the view that effective action against organised crime requires a
consistent and robust mechanism to confiscate criminal proceeds, and it is desirable that
the agency with sufficient experience and expertise takes on this task. Exclusion of the
NCA can also undermine the multi-agency approach and inter-agency co-operation.
Therefore, organised crime should be regarded as a politically neutral issue, and Northern
Ireland should allow the NCA to carry out this function. The issue of accountability could
be mitigated to some extent by allowing the NCA to provide regular information to the
relevant bodies such as the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Department of Justice, and the
OCTF. In addition, as was the case for SOCA, a provision could be made for the Police
Ombudsman to hear complaints relating to the conduct of the NCA.
In Ireland, there are two types of confiscation. The first type is ordered after conviction under the
Criminal Justice Act 1994. It is worth pointing out from the outset that the Irish legislation is often
used as a template for other States, including the United Kingdom, as the Irish legislation predates
the other legislation. One interesting aspect of asset recovery is the procedural differences
depending on the types of crimes committed. Drug trafficking entails enhanced confiscation,
while for other crimes, the DPP has to prove that any benefit was generated solely as a result of
a crime of which one is convicted.258 For example, if one is charged with multiple offences and
convicted of one of them, the court can only issue an order for this convicted offence (but not
others). This is different for drug trafficking where confiscation applies to all criminal activities
connected to this offence. When asked whether this anomaly should be rectified, one prosecutor
stated that it should be. The research team also does not see a reasonable ground for
separate treatment as this can send a wrong message to the general public as well as
criminals, and recommends that Ireland considers amending the legislation so that the
same rule would apply to other forms of organised crime.
It is worth noting here the potential impact of confiscation proceedings on the right to a fair trial.
In the often-cited case of Phillips v United Kingdom (2001)259 before the European Court of Human
Rights, the applicant argued, inter alia, that section 4 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, relating to
the assumptions made by the court that any property held by a convicted person within the
preceding six years represented the criminal proceeds,260 breached article 6, the presumption of
255 Report on Fuel Laundering and Smuggling, 24.  
256 ibid. 
257 ibid.  
258 ss 4-8 for drug trafficking and s 9 for other offences.  
259 App no 41087/98.  
260 The equivalent provisions can be found in the POCA (s 160 for Northern Ireland). 
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innocence in particular. The European Court of Human Rights began by holding that the purpose
of the confiscation proceeding was not to determine the applicant’s guilt (as he had been
convicted previously), and therefore that the presumption of innocence did not apply.261 It
continued to emphasise that the assumptions stipulated under the UK legislation were not made
against the applicant’s guilt, and that there were sufficient procedural safeguards in place
(public/open hearing, disclosure of the prosecution’s case, and an opportunity to rebut such an
assumption on the balance of probabilities).262 In the end, the European Court of Human Rights
concluded that there was no violation of article 6. Applying this reasoning to the Criminal Justice
Act 1994 in Ireland, it is clear that it generally complies with this EHCR jurisprudence as it mirrors
the UK legislation, including the relevant safeguards.263
The second type of confiscation is civil recovery without conviction, stipulated under the Proceeds
of Crime Act 1996. Civil recovery orders may be made against property worth at least €13,000
which is deemed to constitute proceeds of crime. Interim orders, which can be made ex parte,
prevent a specified person from dealing with the property for a limited period,264 while interlocutory
orders require concrete evidence. As with the United Kingdom, the civil standard of proof applies
in relation to recovery proceedings.265 Opinion evidence of senior police officers or officers of
Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs is admissible in the application of these orders if the High Court
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that belief, and hearsay evidence can be
admitted. Further, unlike the United Kingdom, the POCA, as amended by the Proceeds of Crime
(Amendment) Act 2005, covers the proceeds and property held abroad, provided that the suspect
is domiciled, resident, or present in Ireland, or that any part of the crime takes place within its
jurisdiction.
When asked about the effectiveness of the POCA, officers from An Garda Síochána’s Criminal
Asset Bureau argued strongly that it was both fair and highly effective. Many officers recounted
the unacceptable situation prior to the enactment of the Act when criminals were able to flaunt
their illicit wealth through the acquisition of desirable properties, sports cars, and other forms of
affluent living. It also seems that good safeguards are in place. Judicial scrutiny is provided by a
specialist Judge in the High Court, and there is an option to have confiscated property returned
under appeal up to seven years after it has been removed from the claimant. One High Court
Judge interviewed stated that the system is generally efficient. One of the reasons for this is that
relevant agencies (eg An Garda Síochána and Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs) communicate
with each other regularly, ensuring consistency. However, a defence lawyer expressed some
concerns over the civil recovery process including the reversal of the burden of proof to the
defendant and other risks to due process brought about by the bargaining policy on which assets
can be seized. It should be noted here that in Gilligan v CAB, the submission that the POCA
violated the Constitution by interfering with the judicial function and infringing guarantees on
private property rights was rejected by the Supreme Court.266 This suggests that the civil recovery
regime is regarded as constitutional and generally compliant with human rights in Ireland, similar
to the United Kingdom.
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While it seems evident that the law enforcement communities in both jurisdictions have become
more proactive in tracing and confiscating criminal proceeds compared to the past, given the
sophisticated nature of criminal operations noted above, challenges still remain. A question
remains whether the relevant authorities have been able to confiscate the majority of the criminal
proceeds in both jurisdictions. Between 2012 and 2013, Northern Ireland seized £1.359 million
of criminal assets,267 while the confiscated amount in the previous year was £4.422 million.268 In
Ireland, criminal assets worth €2.764 million were seized in 2012.269 While this figure represents
an increase compared to 2011 (€2.010 million),270 the amount was higher in 2010 (€3.051
million).271 While a number of factors need to be taken into consideration in analysing these
figures, it is also the fact that money laundering has become much more elaborate and
transnational in recent times, and a large amount of criminal proceeds are not traced in reality.
Some frustrations were expressed by interviewees in this regard. This necessitates closer co-
operation with financial institutions so that they can report suspicious transactions. In addition,
the punishment regime for money laundering needs to be strengthened, as emphasised above.
The Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) also mentioned difficulties in exchanging information or
evidence through mutual legal assistance. The CAB operates under the civil offence standard,
whereas the mutual legal assistance transfer mechanism is for criminal prosecutions. Therefore,
the CAB can send out a mutual legal assistance request for evidence, but the information it gains
cannot be used in the civil environment as it does not have the same effect in court. One officer
reported that this problem can be circumvented by asking other countries for their permission to
use the evidence in the civil realm, or by asking them to provide an expert witness. However,
some States have actually refused such permission, because they do not recognise non-
conviction-based confiscations. In comparison, it has become a common practice for officers
from HMRC and the PSNI in Northern Ireland to give evidence in civil recovery cases.
An important facility to alleviate this problem to some extent is the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-
Agency Network (CARIN Group), which consists of an informal network of asset recovery offices
and agents. The name comes from the Camden Court Hotel in Dublin where the first meeting
was held in 2003. It originally involved 5 European States with asset recovery legislation for the
purpose of comparing good practice. There are now 53 States, and Dublin recently hosted the
2013 annual conference with over 130 delegates attending. This has facilitated better co-
ordination and dialogue among Member States to strengthen their asset recovery capability, and
should be regarded as an example of good practice.
In summary, it seems evident that there is scope for improvement in relation to criminal
proceedings and confiscation of criminal proceeds.
267 OCTF Annual Report 2013, 20. 
268 OCTF Annual Report 2012, 19.   
269 Office of the DPP, Annual Report 2012, 60. 
270 Office of the DPP, Annual Report 2011, 58.
271 Office of the DPP, Annual Report 2010, 66.  
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Section 5: Prevention of
Organised Crime
The prevention of organised crime has become an important consideration in Northern Ireland
and Ireland, with both jurisdictions describing a variety of actions that are intended to raise public
awareness, reduce demand for illicit goods and services, and restrict the opportunities for
organised criminals to profit from their enterprises. In Northern Ireland, the OCTF uses threat
assessments of organised crime activities to identify the areas of vulnerability and works with
stakeholders to reduce the risks that are posed to their homes and businesses. A representative
from the OCTF described one initiative in particular where the OCTF introduced a range of
measures in response to a spate of cash-in-transit robberies. These included setting up a control
room to co-ordinate the movement of cash, encouraging courier companies to incorporate a
range of security features such as smoke and dye boxes and GPS trackers, and building
awareness of the key weaknesses in cash-in-transit operations. As a result, the number of cash-
in-transit robberies was said to have fallen from 121 incidents in 2001 to just 25 incidents in
2012.272
The NIOCS has also placed emphasis on the reduction of harm through more proactive research,
awareness raising, and prevention. Significant progress has been made, for example, in the area
of human trafficking. The Northern Ireland government developed a multimedia educational
resource pack which has been made available to all post-primary schools273 in line with the Annual
Action Plan on Human Trafficking.274 Another example of good practice is the ‘Changing the
Mindset Campaign,’ which has been launched in order to deepen the general public’s
understanding of how their actions result in undesirable consequences such as the growth of
related crimes and financing of terrorism.275 As part of this initiative, the OCTF and PSNI released
a short video entitled 'Organised Crime, It's Closer Than You Think’.276 This clip highlights key
areas where ordinary people may be affected by organised crime, particularly through the
purchase of illicit goods and services. It was made available via YouTube and social networking
sites, allowing the OCTF to engage with politicians, civil society groups, and the general public.
However, it is important to analyse the effectiveness of such initiatives. A similar exercise was
done in relation to human trafficking through the ‘Blue Blindfold Campaign’ in 2011. Information
about human trafficking was communicated through media, the internet, and other outlets such
as billboards and advertising space in Northern Ireland. At the end of this campaign, the OCTF
claimed that approximately 35% of adults (ie 500,000 people) saw it.277 Whether this can be seen
as a success is open to question as the campaign itself was regarded as largely ineffective by
relevant stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental. In January 2013, the Minister
of Justice launched a Crimestoppers campaign to highlight the issues of human trafficking and
exploitation, which included the dissemination of a YouTube clip entitled ‘Read the Signs’.278
272 OCTF Annual Report 2012, 8.  
273 In addition, the government recently launched the information booklet Human Trafficking Know Your Rights: A Leaflet for Adult Victims of Human Trafficking.
274 See, for example, Northern Ireland Human Trafficking Action Plan 2013-2014. 
275 Changing the Mindset, Organised Crime Awareness Raising and Engagement Strategy, 1-2, (November 2013).
276 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8Ap6D53RB8&list=PLdQTnZqJDSoKK_0O5wovC54KKXJQGUHzH> accessed 14 January 2014.   
277 OCTF Annual Report 2011.  
278 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bR78_D3dR5E> 14 January 2014. 
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According to the Department of Justice, the clip attracted over 62,100 hits within 3 months of its
launch across the UK, including 15,395 views in Northern Ireland. While this may indicate that
the general public is more aware of human trafficking compared to the past, the total number of
viewings as of January 2014 was just over 63,500, not a significant increase after the initial three-
month period.
In terms of the aforementioned video ‘Organised Crime: It’s Closer than You Think’, it has received
less than 600 hits on YouTube as of January 2014, and this suggests that the campaign’s potential
has not been realised as yet. When asked about this, a representative of the Department of Justice
reflected that although it would be highly desirable to conduct a large television campaign or
similar initiative to raise public awareness of organised crime, the resources that are needed for
such a campaign were not available at that time. It is important to reiterate here that effective
confiscation and use of criminal proceeds can alleviate this problem. The video itself was
created thanks to aforementioned ARIS, but there is scope to utilise this resource further so that
the general public is better educated.
Another issue to be pointed out is the value of annual reports and threat assessments published
by the governments. One of the important functions of these publications is to provide information
via the internet and other means to the general public so that they are better educated on issues
relating to organised crime. However, the extent to which they fulfil this function is not clear. These
publications are rarely advertised through the local media, and it is premature to assume that the
members of the general public actively access them. It should be highlighted here that only 33%
of the respondents to the recent survey on organised crime knew what the OCTF was.279 In
addition, it is a fact that people continue to purchase illicit goods and services in Northern Ireland.
The drug prevalence survey conducted in the island of Ireland revealed that life-time use of
cannabis in Northern Ireland has steadily increased.280 A recent report published by
PricewaterhouseCoopers also suggests that people in Northern Ireland buy more counterfeit
goods than other regions of the United Kingdom.281 Crucially, only about a half of the respondents
stated in the aforementioned organised crime survey that their role in tackling organised crime
included refusing to purchase illicit goods and services.282 This shows a lack of sufficient
understanding of organised crime and casts some doubts on the value of these publications in
educating the general public. The PSNI and the Policing Board also raised some concerns in this
regard.
While it is important to recognise some progress in areas such as human trafficking, the
law enforcement community could do more to reach out to the local/national media outlets
as well as civil society groups (human rights NGOs, youth groups, church organisations,
etc) to acquire their co-operation for wider dissemination of relevant information. They
should also target local communities experiencing social exclusion and poverty where there
is an increased risk of people getting involved in criminal activities. In addition, given the
strong nexus between organised crime and terrorism, a clear message that the purchase
of illicit goods and services fuels terrorism should be effectively communicated to the
public. The continuation of community outreach/policing is therefore essential. It is
72 |  AHRC Research Project
279 Omnibus Survey, 14.  7% and 3% of the respondents said they became aware of the OCTF through government publications and their websites respectively. 
280 From 16.8% (2002-2003) to 24% (2010-2011). A similar picture emerges in Ireland as well. Cross-Border Organised Crime Assessment 2012, 9. See also
Department of Health, Social Services, and Public Safety (DHSSPS), A Framework for Reducing Alcohol and Drug Related Harm in Northern Ireland 2011-2016,
11-20 for a detailed discussion of the impact of illegal drugs in Northern Ireland.
281 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Counterfeit Goods in the UK: Who is Buying What and Why? (October 2013), 5.  
282 Omnibus Survey, 7-9.
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important here to acknowledge that prevention should not be the job of the law enforcement
bodies alone. All relevant Departments in Northern Ireland, including Departments of
Education, Health and Social Development, must work together to devise a coherent and
effective prevention strategy. An example of good practice is the overall strategy for alcohol
and drugs, which was developed by the Department of Health, Social Services and Public
Safety in partnership with other agencies such as the Department of Justice and the PSNI.283
More of these can be facilitated by proactive participation of these and possible other
bodies in the OCTF informally or formally. Further, the Northern Ireland Assembly should
treat organised crime as a politically neutral issue, facilitate cross-party consensus, and
render its support to the law enforcement community as well as the civil society sector.
In Ireland, An Garda Síochána deploys a range of measures designed to prevent organised crime
by engaging with communities and stakeholders. Officers from the Garda National Drugs Unit
actively contribute to the National Drugs Strategy, which sets indicators and benchmarks around
the five pillars of reduction, prevention, research, rehabilitation, and treatment.284 The Unit,
together with other agencies such as Revenue, Irish Tax and Customs and the Department of
Education, visits schools to educate children and young adults about the dangers of drugs. The
Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation also provides a wide range of fraud prevention advice on its
website covering areas such as ATM fraud, identity theft, counterfeit currency, and unsolicited
emails.285 In addition, the National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Trafficking of Human
Beings in Ireland 2009-2012 set out a range of activities designed to prevent human trafficking,
including raising awareness and reducing demand through public campaigns and education. It
is worth mentioning in this regard that the Garda Anti-Trafficking Unit in 2012 conducted
awareness training for over 4,000 probation officers, 192 ethnic liaison officers, 124 immigration
officers, 42 Garda reserves, 80 Garda senior investigative officers, and 500 community
stakeholders. Ireland also initiated the Blue Blindfold Campaign to reach out to the general public.
When asked about the success of all this and other measures, an official from the Department of
Justice and Equality argued that good progress had been made considering the resources that
are available.
At the community level, a representative from the Department of Justice and Equality stated that
the Irish government supports An Garda Síochána to work closely with communities, particularly
by targeting young people at risk of engaging in crime and gang activities. For example, a
partnership between An Garda Síochána, the Irish Youth Justice Service, and the Department of
Justice and Equality resulted in the creation of 100 Garda Youth Diversion Projects. These projects
have facilitated personal development and civic responsibility, and provided opportunities to
improve vocational skills. The original intention of government was to expand this programme
by another 68 projects, but that expansion was abandoned in 2011 due to the economic
downturn.286 In relation to human trafficking, the Garda officers in Donegal in the past conducted
regular training for the employees of the Health Service Executive (eg doctors, consultants, and
nurses). When asked about the effectiveness of these interventions, several Garda officers noted
that An Garda Síochána could be more proactive in this area, and that this was their aim going
forward.
283 New Strategic Direction for Alcohol and Drugs: Phase 2 (2011-2016).
284 Ireland National Drugs Strategy 2009-2016, 6.
285 See also, Irish Banking Federation and An Garda Síochána, A Guide to Fraud Prevention (2009).
286 Progress Report on Garda Youth Project Development 2009-2011.
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Overall the impact of prevention in Ireland seems to be similar to Northern Ireland given that the
general public continues to purchase and consume illicit goods and services. Between January
and October 2013, for example, 929 litres of counterfeit alcohol were confiscated by Revenue,
Irish Tax and Customs, four times more than the previous year.287 As noted above, the number of
illegal or counterfeit cigarettes being consumed has also increased in recent times. Therefore,
the same recommendations on prevention noted above are also proposed for Ireland. 
74 |  AHRC Research Project
287 The Irish Times, ‘Bootleg Alcohol Seizures Rise Dramatically’ (28 December 2013).   
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Section 6: Measuring the
Effectiveness of Responses 
to Organised Crime
Setting appropriate benchmarks and performance indicators is important in measuring the
effectiveness of responses to organised crime. The current benchmarks tend to focus on key
criminal justice outcomes such as the number of organised crime gangs dismantled and
convicted, or the amount of drugs, cash, or illicit property that has been confiscated. These are
reflected in the Annual Policing Plan prepared by the PSNI and agreed by the Policing Board.288
The Policing Plan also requires the PSNI to demonstrate its progress in tackling organised crime
by reporting on actions taken to reduce the harm caused by human exploitation and drugs, as
well as charting the amount recovered from confiscation of criminal finances.289 This practice is
quite similar in Ireland as An Garda Síochána regularly releases figures charting the success it
has had in targeting organised crime groups and seizing illicit goods and criminal proceeds.290 
While these statistics are helpful in highlighting the nature and extent of organised crime, they do
not necessarily provide accurate benchmarks to measure the effectiveness of law enforcement.
For example, increased confiscation of drugs in a given year may simply mean that more drugs
were available compared to the previous year(s), and does not always indicate that the response
of the law enforcement communities has been effective. On the contrary, the clandestine nature
of the illegal markets and criminal activities generally means that these statistics are just the tip
of the iceberg.
Some of those interviewed also voiced doubt as to whether the current methods of measuring
performance are appropriate. Detective Chief Superintendent Roy McComb noted that setting
targets based on the number of organised crime gangs would not always produce an accurate
assessment of the proliferation of organised crime:
The first OCTF Threat Assessment identified 78 organised groups operating
in Northern Ireland, and as of two days ago (September 2013) there are 142.
Is that because we are simply not winning the battle? Or is it just that we now
have a richer knowledge of organised crime in this jurisdiction, and we were
simply underestimating the threat 12 years ago?
He added that the PSNI had tried to move away from providing a number against which its
performance is assessed, as it is difficult to assign meaning to the figures when organised crime
288 Northern Ireland Policing Board, Policing Plan 2012-2015:Update for 2013/14.
289 ibid.
290 An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2012, 3.
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groups often reform or reinvent their structures after every police operation. Some representatives
of the Policing Board also agree that it is difficult to decipher what these figures mean without
first understanding the context from which they are collected. They also recognise that the PSNI
cannot always provide accurate figures due to the need to protect sources of intelligence.
Their colleagues in Ireland also share similar views. An officer from the National Drugs Unit noted
that year-to-year figures for the seizures of drugs and money have little value as these totals will
only form a small proportion of the actual drugs commodity that is out on the streets. This problem
was also expressed in the context of civil recovery of assets. Some CAB officers stated that
success is often measured against disrupting the activity of organised groups. In Ireland, this
often means that organised criminals have been forced to move outside the jurisdiction. In reality,
this is only displacing the problem as criminals will continue to control Irish crime networks from
outside the country. In any event, all of these point to a conclusion that threat assessments and
statistics do not always serve as an effective tool for measuring law enforcement performance
and devising appropriate strategies to combat organised crime.
Instead of focusing too much on law enforcement statistics, many of those interviewed suggested
that they ought to consider broader social contexts which fuel the demand for illicit goods and
services. As stressed above, this requires involvement of other relevant stakeholders so that they
can consider a diverse range of benchmarks which may include, but which are not limited to,
poverty/economic hardship, social/cultural exclusion, education on organised crime provided to
children and young adults, and rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. Human rights
compliance should also be incorporated as this will help boost public confidence in law
enforcement. All of these mean that organised crime should not simply be regarded as a criminal
justice issue. It is important to acknowledge that it has social, economic, and cultural dimensions,
and these should be factored into the overall benchmarks. In so doing, it is essential that both
governments are able to measure the impact and effectiveness of these benchmarks to allow
reflection and improvement where appropriate. The research team believes that a truly multi-
agency/intergovernmental approach, which also reflects the voices of the non-governmental
sector and the general public sufficiently, is the key to the successful implementation of
effective action against organised crime, and recommends that both Northern Ireland and
Ireland continue their efforts and good practice in this regard.
76 |  AHRC Research Project
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Conclusion
This project has examined the extent to which Northern Ireland and Ireland have been
implementing effective action against organised crime. It is clear that both jurisdictions have been
making good progress in tackling organised crime. Intelligence-led law enforcement is actively
facilitated with the use of special investigative techniques in both jurisdictions, and the relevant
agencies generally regard the existing legislative and policy frameworks to be adequate in this
regard, including their ability to address the nexus between organised crime and terrorism.
National laws and policies on organised crime are also largely in compliance with the relevant
international and European standards, although there is scope for improvement in certain areas
such as legal certainty, sentencing, and judicial oversight. Another important aspect is a multi-
agency approach. It was discovered that the OCTF in Northern Ireland provides a useful forum
for concerned agencies to meet and discuss issues of mutual interest and to facilitate closer co-
operation. While the law enforcement agencies in Ireland work well with each other, they might
benefit from a similar arrangement. In relation to cross-border co-operation between two
jurisdictions, the current state of affairs is generally positive. In addition to formal arrangements
such as ILORs and EAWs, an informal approach is regularly facilitated by frontline officers and
prosecutors. This cannot be done without a sufficient level of mutual respect and trust. In
summary, there are numerous examples of good practice in law enforcement, and these should
be clearly and widely acknowledged by the political community as well as the general public.
However, there are a number of issues which require further consideration and improvement
simultaneously. To begin with, both jurisdictions should do more to address the supply and
demand dynamics. The general public continues to purchase illicit goods and services, and this
suggests that the current preventive strategies are not as effective. Another major issue is a lack
of adequate resources on the part of law enforcement agencies. It is essential that law
enforcement agencies are well trained and resourced so that they can take appropriate action.
There is also scope for improvement in relation to sentencing and confiscation of criminal
proceeds so as to maximise the deterrent effect and make the island of Ireland a hostile
environment for criminals to operate. Moreover, human rights consideration and protection should
be strengthened with regular training of frontline officers and more rigorous judicial oversight in
some areas such as the use of special investigative techniques and the DPP’s decisions on the
use of non-jury trials in both jurisdictions. Finally, in order to facilitate a truly multi-agency
response, all relevant government Departments should work together more closely, taking into
account the voices of the civil society sector and the general public.
 
North–South Irish Responses to Transnational Organised Crime  Research Report of Findings  |  77
21895_Brian Payne_Layout 1  13/03/2014  12:19  Page 77
78 |  AHRC Research Project
 
21895_Brian Payne_Layout 1  13/03/2014  12:19  Page 78
 North–South Irish Responses to Transnational Organised Crime  Research Report of Findings  |  79
21895_Brian Payne_Layout 1  13/03/2014  12:19  Page 79
80 |  AHRC Research Project
 
21895_Brian Payne_Layout 1  13/03/2014  12:19  Page 80


